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ABSTRACT
After reviewing the stylised facts concerning Japan’s low level of inward investment and the
explanations for these facts put forward in the literature, this paper examines the licensing and
investment behaviour of Dutch multinational enterprises in Japan. It is shown that aggregate
data on Dutch foreign direct investment in Japan substantially underestimate the presence of
Dutch firms. Survey data indicate that employment in affiliates of Dutch multinationals
reached at least 12,000 in 1995. The largest five industrial groups (Shell, Unilever, Philips,
Akzo-Nobel and DSM) are responsible for more than 90 percent of Dutch investment. Dutch
affiliates on balance register a trade surplus with the rest of the world and with the
Netherlands, which contrasts with the trade pattern of other foreign affiliates in Japan. The
trade surplus is due to the active procurement of Japanese components and materials for
world-wide operations by some affiliates, and the export-oriented manufacturing operations of
affiliates in the electronics and speciality chemicals sectors. The data also reveal a diversity of
investment strategies, from a focus on wholly and majority owned operations and intra-group
transfers (Shell and Unilever), to an almost exclusive use of joint ventures coupled with
licensing agreements with independent Japanese firm (DSM and Akzo-Nobel). A striking
feature of Dutch investment in Japan remains the complete absence of a large number of
multinationals with expanding operations in Europe and the United States. The new
opportunities for market entry and acquisitions in Japan in the late 1990s, demonstrated by
the expansion of a number of Dutch firms, warrant a much greater focus on the Japanese
market than has been the case until today.
31. Introduction
It is commonly understood that Japan is the outlier among the major industrialised
countries in terms of its foreign direct investment (FDI) position. Japanese statistics based on
notifications of foreign investments to Japan's Ministry of Finance show a cumulative balance
of outward over inward investment of 14 to 1 in 1995 [MOF (1995)]. This imbalance is due
to a low level of inward investment, which has incited much debate about the trade and
investment barriers facing foreign firms in Japan and its historical restrictions on inward
investment until the late 1970s. This paper examines the investment position of Dutch
multinationals in Japanese industries. It does so by examining in turn aggregate FDI data,
survey data among foreign affiliated firms in Japan by industry, and characteristics of the main
subsidiaries of Dutch MNEs in Japan. Comparisons are made with FDI from other countries
to highlight strengths and weaknesses of Dutch firms. Since it has been argued that trade and
investment barriers have forced foreign firms to rely extensively on licensing to exploit their
technological and marketing strengths in Japan, the available information on the number of
licenses sold by Dutch firms in Japan is examined as well.
The pattern of Dutch firms' involvement in Japan cannot be fully understood without due
attention to the particularities of the trade and investment environment in Japan. The next
section first establishes the 'stylised facts' concerning inward FDI in Japan (2.1). The
empirical literature on FDI in Japan is reviewed to seek explanations (2.2), and attention is
given to the most recent trends of deregulation and decreased hostility to foreign acquisitions
providing greater opportunities for foreign firms (2.3). Section 3 examines Dutch firms'
involvement in Japan by looking at investments flows and stocks (3.1), characteristics of
Dutch MNEs' operations in Japan by industry (3.2), and licensing patterns by industry.
Section 4 then takes a micro focus in presenting key data on the main subsidiaries of Dutch
MNEs in Japan in 1995 (4.1). Information on licensing behaviour by Dutch MNEs in Japan,
though only available for the period 1981-1986, highlights differences in investment
behaviour between firms. Section 5 concludes.
2. Japan's Low Level of Inward Investment
An often quoted publication by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) suggests that foreign affiliated firms are responsible for a mere 0.9 percent of total
sales of incorporated businesses in Japan [MITI (1995a)], which compares to a figure
exceeding 10 percent in the United States [Weinstein (1996a)]. However, these aggregate
4figures have to be qualified considerably after more careful examination of the data, while
they also hide substantial variation across industries. This section seeks to establish the
'stylised facts' pertaining to inward FDI in Japan (paragraph 2.1) before turning to the
explanations given for the characteristics of this inward investment (paragraph 2.2).
Paragraph 2.3 looks at some recent trends in foreign firms' involvement in Japan.
2.1 FDI in Japan: Stylised Facts
The Investment Imbalance
How does Japan's FDI imbalance compare with the FDI positions of other industrialised
countries? The figures on investment notifications from the Ministry of Finance suggest a
major investment imbalance but are unlikely to give an accurate picture: the figures include
planned investments which are not necessarily followed through, and divestments and loan
repayments are not recorded (but neither are reinvested earnings or expansions of branches).
As an alternative and comparable indicator of the FDI imbalance, Table 1 shows outward and
inward FDI based on balance of payments data during the period 1990-1994. The figures
appear to confirm Japan's huge FDI imbalance: with cumulative FDI outflows of 127 billion
US$ and inflows of 6.8 billion US$, Japan recorded a outward to inward FDI ratio of 18.6.
This compares to ratios of 1.3 for the United States, 1.2 for the United Kingdom, 1.5 for
France, and 1.8 for the Netherlands. On the other hand, Japan's imbalance is not entirely
unique since Germany recorded a ratio of 15.4. Although the German ratio is affected by a
large divestment in 1994, the exceptionally low Japanese inward investment figure for 1993 is
also due to a large (1.65 billion US$) divestment by the Dutch electronics group Philips from
a joint venture with Matsushita Electric (see paragraph 4.1).
INSERT TABLE 1
The balance of payments data in Table 1 still have several drawbacks. They do not includ
reinvested earnings and do not take account of revaluation of assets. More fundamentally, FDI
flow data only measure the share of foreign affiliated firms' assets which is financed from the
investing firms' home country. They underestimate the importance of foreign firms' activities
in the local economy since subsidiaries also rely on local as well as international loans and
equity to finance their operations.1 Survey data on foreign affiliated firms do not have this
                                         
1 There is evidence that the parent firm is certainly not the main source of finance for affiliates in Japan. In the
1994 MITI survey among foreign affiliated firms in Japan, foreign subsidiaries reported that only 10 percent of all
loans were obtained from the parent firm, while the parent financed only 1 percent of investments in fixed capital
[MITI (1995a, 161-163)].
5drawback.2 Table 2 presents figures on Japan's investment imbalance, world-wide as well as
with Europe and the United States separately, desaggregated by industry. The data are
employment figures drawn from MITI's surveys among foreign affiliated firms in Japan [MITI
(1995a)] and Japanese multinational enterprises [MITI (1995b)]. There are a number of
possible biases in these figures. The surveys are not mandatory and response rates are not very
high (65 percent for outward FDI and 50 percent for inward FDI) and may vary across
industries. The ownership criteria for outward and inward FDI are unfortunately not
comparable. Outward FDI excludes firms in which the Japanese investors have a less than 10
percent stake but a minimum of 33 percent is required in case of inward FDI. As a solution to
this problem, and considering that outward FDI has the greater response rate, the figures on
Japanese affiliates abroad are restricted to majority owned subsidiaries, for which MITI
(1995b) does publish a number of separate tables.
INSERT TABLE 2
In Table 2, the ratio of outward to inward investment based on employment in
multinational enterprises is estimated at about 8 to 1.3 This is still high, but considerably
below MOF's ratio of 14 and the ratio in Table 1. The bilateral investment imbalances with
the United States (3.6) and Europe (4.9) are again considerably smaller.4 There are also major
differences across industries. Much lower world-wide investment imbalances are recorded for
oil, chemicals & pharmaceuticals, wood & paper, and non-ferrous metals5, - all industries in
which Japanese firms do not possess clear ownership-specific advantages vis-à-vis foreign
firms. In oil, chemicals & pharmaceuticals (US), and precision machinery (US and Europe),
the figures show a FDI deficit. In contrast, the highest investment imbalances are recorded for
industries in which Japanese firms are major competitors on world markets: transport
machinery (automobiles, motor cycles, shipbuilding) and steel. In the electronics industry,
employment in Japanese-affiliated subsidiaries abroad (mostly in consumer electronics and
components) is very substantial, but the investment imbalance is held in check by US
investments by IBM and Apple in the computers industry. The investment in balance in
                                         
2 Furthermore, notification data on inward FDI by MOF (1995) are not desaggregated by industry and country
but such desaggregation is available for outward FDI.
3 If minority owned overseas subsidiaries of Japanese firms were to be included, the ratio would increase to 11.5.
4 The investment ratio with the US compares quite well with figures drawn from US Department of Commerce
data on Japanese affiliates in the US and US affiliates in Japan. Dunning and Narula (1994) report that US FDI in
Japan in 1990 was 21 billion US$, while Japanese FDI in the US was 83 billion US$, which implies a FDI ratio of
roughly 4.
5 Canadian investment is responsible for foreign affiliated employment in non-ferrous metals. Alcan aluminium,
the world's second largest aluminium producer, has controlling stakes in two listed Japanese aluminium
manufacturers, Toyo Aluminium and Nippon Light Metal Industries.
6textiles is a result of large investments in Asian manufacturing plants which mostly export
back to Japan.
The non-manufacturing sectors distribution, services (transport, consultancy, software,
advertising, leisure) and 'other non-manufacturing' industries (mining, construction,
telecommunications, banking & insurance, real estate, utilities) have higher than average
investment imbalances. Given that Japanese firms are not perceived to possess advantages in
most non-manufacturing sectors (clear examples are insurance, telecommunications, and
software), these sectors appear the most important outliers. Non-manufacturing sectors are
much more tightly regulated than the manufacturing sector in Japan, while the remaining
explicit restrictions on foreign ownership are concentrated here as well, as will be seen below.
Foreign Firms' Presence in Japan
Based on its survey among foreign-affiliated firms in Japan, MITI (1995a) reports that
they are responsible for a mere 0.9 percent of sales of incorporated businesses in Japan; for
the manufacturing sector this is 2.3 percent. These figures also appear in MITI's English
language publications [JETRO (1996)] and have been quoted to emphasise the meagre role of
foreign firms in the Japanese economy. However, it is obvious that the MITI figures
substantially underestimate the stake of foreign firms: there is no correction for the 50 percent
response rate, the survey does not include the whole population of foreign affiliated firms, and
affiliates owned less than 33 percent are excluded (and therewith large investments such as
Ford's in Mazda). Weinstein (1996a) uses the more comprehensive survey data published by
Toyo Keizai (1995) and estimates the sales share of foreign firms as closer to 6 percent, six
times higher than the MITI number. Foreign firms' presence in Japan is still lower than in
other industrialised countries, but not as dramatically as suggested by official figures
published by MITI.
Entry Modes
Inward investment in Japan has a particular distribution among the three main modes of
entry (wholly owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, and acquisitions). There is an abundance of
joint ventures but wholly owned subsidiaries, and acquisitions in particular, are
underrepresented. The 1994 MITI survey indicates that 52 percent of foreign affiliated firms
responding to the survey were wholly owned, while 36 percent were minority joint ventures. A
similar survey in 1991 shows that in only 7.1 percent of cases did foreign firms gain control
7by acquiring a stake in an existing Japanese firm.6 Enca nation (1993) shows that US
multinationals have entered Japan much more often by way of minority owned joint venture
than they did in other industrialised countries: minority owned ventures were responsible for
63 percent of all US affiliate sales in Japan, but for only 23 percent of sales in all developed
countries. Figures on mergers and acquisitions involving Japanese firms also show a large
discrepancy between the number of foreign acquisitions in Japan (18 in 1990), and both the
number of Japanese acquisitions abroad (440) and Japanese acquisitions in Japan (293)
[Lawrence (1992)].
Licensing
Another feature of foreign firms' involvement in Japan, and the corollary of their limited
direct investment in Japan, is a relatively strong reliance on licensing as a means to exploit
know-how and technological advantages. Balance of payments data for 1994 show that Japan
is by far the greatest importer of technology as measured by payments of royalties and
licensing fees. Japan paid fees amounting to 8.29 billion US$, higher than payments by the
US (5.67 billion), Germany (4.44 billion), and the UK (2.40) [JETRO (1997)]. The available
data on US multinationals' investment and licensing in Japan suggest that a substantial share
of royalty and licensing income is from firms in which they do not have an equity stake rather
than from affiliated firms. The ratio of US multinationals' royalty and licensing income from
affiliated firms to payments by unaffiliated firms in Japan was 1.37 in 1990, which contrasted
with a ratio of 3.63 for the rest of the world [Dunning and Narula (1994), Lawrence (1992)].
2.2 Explanations
A great number of explanations for the particular characteristics and low level of inward
FDI in Japan have been brought forward. This paragraph briefly reviews the main arguments.
Regulation of Inward Investment
The most obvious and important factor explaining Japan's low level of inward investment
is the legacy of three decades of tight restrictions on and regulation of inward investment. In
                                         
6 See MITI (1992). The more recent MITI surveys no longer ask for the establishment details of the subsidiaries.
Note that the 1991 survey only covered subsidiaries in which foreign firms had a stake equal to or greater than 50
percent.
8the post war period of rebuilding the economy, the Japanese government saw the regulation of
the transfer of technology (licensing) and capital (direct investment) to Japan as an
indispensable part of its industrial policy which aimed at fostering indigenous capabilities.
After regaining independence in 1949, Japan passed two laws, the Foreign Exc ange and
Foreign Trade Control Law and the Foreign Investment Law, which gave MITI broad
powers in regulating both inward investment and licensing by foreign firms in Japan. MITI
used these powers to ban acquisitions and most wholly owned foreign ventures, and to
negotiate instead cost effective licensing deals for Japanese companies [Bailey, Harte and
Sugden (1992), Odagiri and Goto (1996, 44-51)]. For instance, IBM was allowed to set up a
wholly owned subsidiary but only after it licensed major computer patents to Japanese
competitors. Texas Instruments was forced to engage in similar licensing deals while it was
refused permission to set up a wholly owned subsidiary (instead it was agreed that it set up a
joint venture with Sony). In 1967, Japan reluctantly introduced the first step-wise
liberalisation of foreign investment, which had become necessary after Japan joined the
OECD in 1963. The 1967 refinement to the practice of administering the Foreign Investment
Law implied that for selected industries, 100 percent ownership was allowed in principle,
while in a group of other industries minority ventures were allowed if a number of conditions
were met. MITI retained broad powers to disapprove foreign investments in the industries
falling under the new regime [Bailey, Harte and Sugden (1992)]. Under successive changes in
implementation of the law over the next 13 years, more industries were added to the minority
owned and then the wholly owned categories. Yet a number of industries in which foreign
firms had considerable strengths and wished to invest, such as semiconductors, computers,
pharmaceuticals, and distribution, were not among them [Nakamura et al. (1995)]. It was not
until 1980, with the abolition of the Foreign Investment Law, that foreign investment became
liberalised with the exception of only a limited number of industries.7 Since the 1980s, prior
notification to the Bank of Japan is all that is required to allow investment projects, including
acquisitions, although MITI retained the (sparsely used) right to block investments.8 In 1992,
the notification requirement was finally changed to ex-post notification.
Government regulation of inward investment explains a good deal of the low level of
inward investment and the relative importance of licensing, as well as the importance of joint
ventures and the scarcity of acquisitions. MITI's strategy of fostering capabilities in Japanese
firms deprived foreign firms of investment opportunities exactly at the time when their relative
competitive advantage made (wholly owned) investments the preferred way of exploiting these
                                         
7 Agriculture, oil refining, leather, forestry and fisheries, aviation, and investment trusts are exempted from
liberalisation, while other restrictions on foreign investment apply in space development, defence and aircraft
industries, utilities, telecommunications, and broadcasting [Nakamura et al. (1995)].
8 For instance, in 1984, MITI protected a number of Japanese firms, including electronics group Hitachi and oil
firms Arab Oil and Tonen, by prohibiting foreign firms to acquire a stake [Nakamura et al. (1995)].
9advantages in Japan. Restrictions were greatest in those industries where foreign firms were
dominant and the lifting of restrictions usually took place after Japanese firms had been able
to attain competitiveness themselves. However, although the selectivity and duration of this
policy intervention coupled with increased Japanese competitiveness may explain to an extent
why there was no big surge in inward investment after 1980, other factors must be responsible
for the 'stylised facts' of inward FDI observed in the early 1990s.
Non-Tariff Barriers and Restrictive Business Practices
A variety of government regulations and business practices as well as economic factors
have been put forward as having an influence on the presence of foreign firms in Japan in
general and inward FDI in particular. Following Sanna-Randaccio (1996), these can be
distinguished into factors affecting trade (exports), those affecting foreign firms' sales in the
local market in general (both exports and sales of locally produced goods), and factors
affecting inward investment only. Barriers solely affecting imports to Japan have generally
been very low throughout the 1980s and 1990s: tariff levels are the lowest among
industrialised countries and quota are mainly concentrated in agricultural products. This
implies that there are not many incentives for foreign firms to engage in 'tariff jumping' FDI.
In contrast, non-tariff and private barriers to foreign firms' sales are perceived to be of
considerable importance. A number of these affect foreign firms and Japanese entrants alike.
They include idiosyncratic technical and product standards, and health, safety, and sanitary
regulations, inadequate access to government contracts and procurement schemes by semi-
government institutions, lack of transparency in government regulations (administrative
guidance), inadequate access to business and industry associations, and difficulties in winning
corporate clients having long standing ties with other Japanese firms in particular within
keiretsu (industrial groups).9 An important factor is also Japan's multi-layered distribution
system. Japan's electronics, automobile, and pharmaceutical firms established large
distribution networks in Japan in the 1960s. Import barriers and restrictions on inward
investments allowed them to maintain profit margins and to finance the considerable cost of
these investments.10 Although the number of independent retailers and wholesalers has risen
in the last decade, Japanese manufacturers still control the majority of retail outlets.
Restrictions on entry in the distribution sector through the La ge Scale Retail Store Law (and
on foreign entry through the Foreign Investment Law) have long prohibited large retailers and
wholesalers to compete effectively with incumbent retailers and wholesalers linked to
                                         
9 See also Mason (1995) and Graham and Yoshitomi (1997).
10 See Belderbos and Holmes (1995) for a discussion of the Japanese CTV industry.
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manufacturers. Given the relative scarcity of independent distributors which are more likely to
stock imported goods and goods manufactured by foreign entrants, foreign firms wishing to
reach a large share of the Japanese market either had to invest substantial amounts over a long
period in setting up their own distribution networks, or to negotiate access to distribution
channels of established Japanese manufacturers. Only the larger foreign firms with sufficient
financial resources and marketing potential effectively had the option to choose the first
route.11 The distribution system appears the more important barrier considering that it is
precisely in this sector where Japanese manufacturers have expanded operations in the United
States and Europe. Williamson (1993) argues that control over distribution, which takes care
of after sales services and facilitates feedback on consumer tastes and better marketing,
explains a substantial part of Japanese firms' export successes.12 In conclusion, the
distribution system and other non-tariff barriers have had a negative impact on both imports
and inward investments. Such barriers have altered the trade-off between internalisation
(exports or FDI) and licensing in favour of the latter. Where investment occurred, foreign
firms had strong incentives to link up with a Japanese partner in a joint venture, since
Japanese incumbents had knowledge of idiosyncratic local standards and practices, and access
to distribution outlets, corporate clients, and government bodies.13
A third group of factors works to limi  the locational advantages of manufacturing FDI in
Japan.14 The 1980s were characterised by rising costs of labour, land, and real estate. The
latter reached astronomical levels at the height of the 'bubble economy' in 1989. There were
also increasing shortages of skilled labour which made it difficult to recruit personnel.
Weinstein (1996b) argues that the life time employment system operated by the larger
Japanese firms and the strong emphasis on in-company training put foreign firms (in
particular new entrants and smaller firms) at a structural disadvantage in Japan. The limited
mid-career labour market hampers the recruitment of experienced personnel and managers, the
type of employee which is in high demand by firms starting up their business in Japan.
Moreover, foreign firms find it difficult to build up a similar reputation among graduates as
established Japanese firms in terms of offering long term job security and career and training
                                         
11 See Batzer and Laumer (1989) for an examination of distribution channels for foreign firms in Japan.
12 Yamawaki (1991) and Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (forthcoming) found evidence that Japanese firms'
investments in distribution networks in the US and the EU have stimulated exports. Encarnation (1993) does note
that US multinationals have to some extent responded to the specific conditions in the Japanese market: they have
invested relatively more in the distribution sector in Japan than they have done in other developed countries.
13 Barkema et al. (1996) argue that such joint ventures are also more likely to be short-lived, because of the
greater difficulties facing such ventures in the light of cultural and managerial differences, but also because
accumulation of local experience by the foreign firm undermines the basis of the joint venture. They find that
(joint) ventures of Dutch multinationals in Japan in particular have a shorter life than subsidiaries elsewhere (with
the exception of Africa).
14 To the extent that these factors also limit the attractiveness of FDI in distribution, they again favour licensing
over internalisation following the arguments above.
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opportunities. A comparison of foreign and Japanese firms’ hiring practices shows that
foreign firms have to paying higher starting salaries in order to attract Japanese graduates
[Weinstein (1996b, pp 162—168)].
The various disadvantages of locating in Japan are not offset by incentives schemes for
(foreign) investors that have become so prevalent in the EU and in most US States. Although
the Japanese government has changed its stance from restricting to welcoming foreign
investors and has established support agencies for foreign investment, financial incentives are
very limited. There are no important grants nor substantial tax incentives available. The Japan
Development Bank and local government bodies do offer low interest loans to investors under
certain conditions, but in practice, investors still require collateral to put together a financial
package. Only 26 out of 44 surveyed prefectural governments operated investment promoting
policies by 1995, of which not more than two had special programs to attract foreign
investors. The relative lack of initiatives here is related to the centralised control over finance
and taxation by the central government in Tokyo, which implies that prefectures cannot
differentiate their policies to a large extent [JETRO (1996)].
A fourth group of business practices and regulations raise barriers to the acquisition of
Japanese firms by foreign companies. These barriers are important because, as Lawrence
(1992) points out, precisely because of the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Japanese
market, foreign firms will have a strong preference for acquisitions to gain access to
distribution channels and marketing knowledge. The scarcity of acquisitions must imply that
barriers have reduced the overall level of foreign investment. There is some evidence pointing
in this direction. In industries where foreign firms' presence is greatest, such as oil refinery
and pharmaceuticals,15 MITI survey data for 1991 also show relatively high shares of entry
through acquisitions [MITI (1992, 21)]. It is often argued that cross-shareholdings within
horizontal keiretsu constitute a major restriction for foreign firms to acquire Japanese
companies [e.g. Lawrence (1992)]. However, the evidence does not appear conclusive.
Although cross-shareholdings in horizontal keiretsu are important, the combined holdings of
group firms in most cases does not reach a majority stake. Low levels of trading in shares of
publicly quoted companies are also the result of the presence of other ‘stable’ shareholders
such as not group-related insurance companies and (trust) banks. Insurance companies appear
to provide ‘stable shareholding’ service to companies in exchange for their clientele. Tight
government regulation of insurance premiums has ruled out direct competition in insurance
markets and insurance companies have therefore looked for other ways to compete for
                                         
15 Nakamura et al (1995) estimate foreign-affiliated firms' share of sales in various industries, weighted by the
foreign investment stake of foreign firms. The highest shares are reported for oil (16.4) and pharmaceuticals
(13.4).
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customers [Weinstein (1996b)]. Government policies have in the past also fostered stable
shareholdings in a more direct way. For instance, in the 1960s, the Ministry of Finance
intervened in a depressed Tokyo stock market by buying up large quantities of shares. It later
sold them on favourable terms to 'stable' shareholders such banks, insurance companies, and
related firms [Odagiri and Goto (1996, 94)]. Although the intervention also coincided with
the liberalisation of foreign acquisitions and an apparent fear of potential foreign takeovers,
'stability' here in first instance meant that the shareholders would not sell the shares in the
short term. Various tax incentives and regulations of the banking and insurance sector
continue to provide substantial incentives for these stable shareholdings [Weinstein
(1996a)].16 Still, the shareholding pattern in itself is not a sufficient explanation. Firms must
also be hostile to takeovers. Odagiri (1992, 330) argues that cross shareholdings also reflect a
more fundamental feature of Japanese industrial organisation and corporate governance.
Stable shareholdings allow managers to pursue the long term growth of the firm and is linked
to life time employment systems and loyalty of workers to the firm. An acquisition by another
firm is seen as a defeat not a rescue, and mergers and acquisition only tend to occur when
firms are in serious difficulties. Firm-specific business culture and life time employment tend
to make it hard for the acquirer to manage and integrate the acquired firm with its other
operations and to benefit substantially from the acquisition. This is all the more so when the
acquirer is a foreign firm with a very different corporate culture.
Empirical Studies of Inward Investment in Japan
A number of empirical studies of manufacturing FDI in Japan have incorporated some of
the above factors in order to find explanations for the pattern of FDI. Eaton and Tamura
(1994) estimate a gravitation model of trade and FDI for the US and Japan and indeed
conclude that the low level of US FDI to Japan is an outlier which cannot be explained by
their empirical model. They posit that the specific characteristics of the Japanese market have
favoured licensing agreements. A recent study by the Japan Development Bank (1997)
establishes that Japan is an outlier in a regression analysis of FDI flows to Japan and other
OECD countries. The study finds that the high corporate tax burden, overvaluation of the
Yen, and the difficulties in hiring personnel due to low labour mobility can explain part of
Japan’s deviation from FDI patterns in other OECD countries. Lawrence (1992) attempts to
measure the effect of keiretsu presence on inward investment. In a cross industry analysis with
                                         
16 Tax advantages also explain part of the phenomenon of shareholdings in vertical keiretsu: suppliers and
distributors centred around major manufacturing firms. Here group firms and in particular the core firm usually
hold a majority stake in suppliers and distributors. By keeping subsidiary units small, firms can benefit from a
favourable tax regime applicable to companies which can be classified as small and medium sized enterprises
[Weinstein (1996a)].
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10 observations he finds that the share of both horizontal and vertical keiretsu firms in
industry sales has a significantly negative effect on the market share of foreign-affiliated firms.
However, these results are highly contentious given the small number of observations and the
fact that the controlling variables in the model (R&D intensity and concentration) which
should measure conventional barriers to entry and FDI, have a counter-intuitive positive sign
[cf. Kogut and Chang (1991), Kim and Lynn (1987)]. Weinstein (1996b) in a similar analysis
combining cross industry and time series analysis also finds a negative sign of keiretsu
presence on inward FDI. However, the coefficient was in most cases not significant, while the
size of the effect of keiretsu was small relative to the positive secular time trend in FDI
inflows. Wakasugi (1995) finds a significant correlation between the sales share of foreign
firms in Japanese industries and the ratio of royalty and licensing fees inflows over outflows.
He also uses data from the MITI surveys among foreign-affiliated firms to establish that the
level of foreign penetration is positively related to the level of foreign subsidiaries' royalty
payments to the parent and the reliance on imports of intermediates from the parent. The
results suggest that ownership-specific factors are an important determinant of FDI patterns.
In other words, industry-specific barriers are not such that they distort FDI decisions to the
extent that the cross-industry pattern of FDI does not reflect the relative competitive
advantage of foreign firms. On the other hand, the results are also consistent with the
persistence of important generic barriers to foreign penetration which affect most industries.
One would expect a particularly strong correlation between ownership-specific factors and
FDI in Japan because the presence of such barriers will allow only the firms with very robust
competitive advantages to make headway in the Japanese market.
Nakamura et al. (1995) offer the most comprehensive analysis of inward FDI in Japan.
They draw on a new mandatory MITI census among all incorporated firms in Japan to enable
analysis of foreign firms' sales shares in 38 industries. There results do not support the
hypothesis that the presence of horizontal and vertical keiretsu impedes FDI. In contrast,
conventional entry barriers, proxied by the Herfindahl concentration index, and capital and
R&D intensity are found to exert a significantly negative influence. The results concerning
conventional entry barriers contrast to an extent with those found for Japanese FDI in the US
in Kogut and Chang (1991). The latter study found that US R&D intensive industries attract
more Japanese FDI, particularly in the form of acquisitions. The negative effect of R&D
intensity on inward FDI in Japan is consistent with the existence of barriers to this type of
acquisitions in Japan. The analysis also included two dummy variables for historic and
present government restrictions on FDI which had a counter-intuitive positive sign. The
positive sign for present restrictions appears solely driven by the oil industry, where foreign
penetration is high due to a historic dominance of US and European firms, despite a system of
formal approval for inward FDI. In oil refining, four of the top 7 Japanese firms are controlled
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by foreign interests. The dominance of foreign firms is a direct result of Japan's post-war need
to secure a stable energy supply. Only the large European and US oil companies had
substantial exploration interest and access to oil supplies, which gave them substantial
bargaining power in negotiations with the Japanese government. In general it can be argued
that the fact that MITI restricted those industries in which Japanese firms were lagging behind
foreign competitors introduced a positive correlation between such restrictions and foreign
firms' competitive advantages and hence FDI.
In conclusion, the empirical work indicates on balance that investment barriers are at
present much less industry-specific (at least for manufacturing industries) but are general
features of Japanese regulatory and business practices. Conventional entry barriers are
important as well, while barriers to acquisitions appear to be a major impediment to foreign
penetration.
3.1 Recent Trends
Recent trends in the 1990s indicate that many of the distinctive features of inward FDI are
finally changing. The main driving force has been Japan's most prolonged post-war recession
which followed the burst of the 'bubble economy' in late 1989. Many firms faced severe
problems with the appreciation of the Yen and the slump in the domestic market in the first
half of the 1990s. After several years of severe losses, Mazda Motor in 1996 allowed Ford to
increase its stake to a de f cto controlling share of 33.8 percent for 52.9 billion Yen. Ford
sent a managing director to lead the firms' reorganisation and integration with Ford's
international operations. This was the first time in post-war history that a foreign firm
acquired a controlling stake in one of Japan's prominent industrial firms. Earlier, South
Korea's Samsung had acquired controlling stakes in microscope and optical equipment
manufacturer Union Optical (listed at the Tokyo Stock Exchange) in 1995, and in the
specialised audio manufacturer Lux (traded at the over the counter market) in 1994.17 Given
the historic rivalry between Korean and Japan, these acquisitions by a South Korean firm
were unprecedented and would have been unthinkable in the 1980s. Three more listed
electronics firms were acquired by foreign companies. Kodak acquired a controlling stake in
Chinon Industries in 1997, a mid-sized optical equipment maker. Audio manufacturer Sansui
was acquired by Polly Peck of the UK and later sold to the Canadian/Hong Kong consumer
products group Semi Tech. Semi Tech later acquired a second listed audio producer, Akai.
Akai (Mitsubishi Electric and Mitsubishi Group), Mazda (Sumitomo Group), and Lux (Alps
and Mitsui Group) were or still are members of vertical or horizontal keiretsu a d not the
                                         
17 Nikkei Weekly, 23 January 1995. Samsung paid 52 million US$ for its stake in Union Optical.
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independent firms which are seen as the typical target of foreign acquisitions. Recent figures
on mergers and acquisitions in Japan confirm a rapid rise in foreign takeovers, with the value
of foreign acquisitions continuously breaking records. The record in 1994 of 1.83 billion
US$, was surpassed by 2.6 billion US$ worth of transactions in 1995 and 3.04 billion US$
(43 cases) in 1996.18
Scattered evidence also indicates a trend towards a greater share of majority or wholly
owned ventures in inward FDI. This trend was already apparent in the early 1990s as
observed by Lawrence (1992). In the 1990s, a number of foreign automobile, chemical and
pharmaceutical firms acquired a majority stake in their joint ventures with Japanese firms, or
set up separate wholly owned ventures in Japan for the first time. An example is
pharmaceutical firm Glaxo (UK) which bought out its joint venture partner in Nippon Glaxo
for 66 billion Yen in 1996. The Dutch electronics group Philips has also been active in
establishing full ownership of a number of Japanese ventures (see paragraph 4.1).
The above suggests that the level of FDI in Japan should be increasing as well. Dunning
and Narula (1994) note that already in the late 1980s US multinationals were moving towards
internalisation of ownership advantages through FDI and away from reliance on licensing to
independent Japanese firms.19 MOF’s FDI notification statistics show a relatively stable value
of new FDI inflows of between 3-4 billion US$ in the first half of the 1990s. A major change
in FDI trends finally occurred in 1996, in which year FDI surged to almost 7 billion dollars,
the highest level ever. In contrast FDI flows based on balance of payments data have not
shown a similar increase (see Table 1). The latter net FDI figures are reduced by a number of
large divestments and rationalisations of older joint ventures by foreign firms in Japan. MOF
notification data are gross figures which do not include withdrawals.
FDI has been spurred by the new opportunities for acquisiti ns and the fall in the costs of
stocks, land and real estate in the mid 1990s. The depreciation of the Yen in 1996 appears to
have given foreign firms the signal to implement their investments plans. The Japanese
government has also slowly but steadily brought standards and regulations in line with
international practices and has made some progress in increasing the transparency of
regulations and public procurement schemes. The government’s deregulation initiatives in a
number of areas such as banking and insurance, retailing, energy, and telecommunications
have provided greater marketing opportunities for foreign firms. A good example is the partial
repeal of the Large Scale Retail Store Law in 1989 which has led to an increasing role of
                                         
18 See Financial Times, 23 January 1997.
19 The ratio of royalty receipts from affiliated firms to royalty receipts from independent companies rose to 1.37
in 1990 from 0.61 in 1982 [Dunning and Narula (1994, 48)].
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large stores and foreign retailers. US toy retailer Toys R Us, whose pressure had been
instrumental in the relaxation of the law, has increased the number of Japanese outlets to 51 in
1996 after setting up its first store in 1991. It is now Japan's largest toy seller with 75 billion
Yen ($610 billion) in sales.20 Another illustrative example is the announcement by US firm
Enron, world leader in natural gas development, to set up a range of industrial waste powered
electricity plants in Japan following liberalisation of Japan's electricity wholesale market in
1996.21
In next two sections it will be seen how Dutch multinationals have adapted their Japanese
operations to the specific conditions affecting inward investment and if they have been able to
benefit from more favourable circumstances for foreign firms in recent years.
3. Characteristics of Dutch FDI and Licensing in Japan by Industry
The persistent barriers to inward investment in Japan are likely to concentrate FDI more in
the larger and most competitive firms, since only these have the necessary financial resources
and technological and managerial capabilities to overcome such barriers. Given that the
greater share of Dutch FDI is by large MNEs with substantial world-wide operations, the 'big
four' Shell, Philips, Unilever, and Akzo-Nobel, it would follow that the level and pattern of
Dutch FDI is less affected by the specific conditions in Japan than FDI from other countries.
Paragraph 3.1 examines FDI flow and stock data to establish both the weight of Japan in
world-wide FDI by Dutch MNEs and the share of Dutch MNEs in total FDI in Japan. In
paragraph 3.2 MITI survey data on foreign-affiliated firms in Japan are explored as an
alternative measure of the inward investment position. The survey also sheds light on the
trading behaviour and profitability of Dutch MNEs in Japan. Finally, paragraph 3.3 examines
the available statistics on Dutch licensing in Japan.
3.1 Dutch FDI in Japan: Investment Flows and Stocks
Figures on FDI stocks published by the Netherlands Central Bank show that out of a total
Dutch foreign investment stock of 259 billion guilders an almost meagre share of 0.5 percent
                                         
20 Nikkei Weekly, 31 March 1997. The entry of Toys R Us has contributed to a strengthening of price competition
in toy retailing. In 1993 more than half of the toys sold in Japan were priced below the manufacturers’ suggested
retail prices, up from 20 percent in 1988 [Japan Development Bank (1997, pp 8)].
21 Nikkei Weekly, 17 March 1997.
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(1,293 million guilders) was invested in Japan in 1994 [DNB (1996)].22 The share of Japan
had been higher five years earlier in 1988, when a 1.1 percent share equalled 1,691 million
guilders [DNB (1990)]. The main reason for this sharp decline in Dutch FDI stocks in Japan
was the divestment by electronics group Philips from its joint venture with Matsushita
Electric in 1993. This is illustrated by DNB statistics on Dutch FDI flows to Japan, which
show a negative figure of 2796 million guilders in 1993. Whilst in 1988, 95 percent of FDI in
Japan was concentrated in the electronics industry, by 1993 FDI in electronics was reduced to
a few million guilders. Still, even the 1.1 percent figure for 1988 is puzzling. Although Shell
has substantial operations in Japan (as will be seen in the next section), the stock data do not
show any substantial investment in the oil & chemical industries. It appears that FDI in Japan
by Shell is mostly the responsibility of the UK arm of the group such that no FDI flows are
recorded between the Netherlands and Japan.23
Another source of data on FDI in Japan, figures on notifications of investments to MOF,
give an indication of the share of Dutch firms in total inward investment. MOF data show a
substantially stronger Dutch investment position in Japan than DNB data. Dutch FDI reached
a cumulative value of 2800 million US$ over the period 1950-1994, which amounted to 8.2
percent of total inward investment [MOF (1995)]. Moreover, in the 1990s the Dutch share of
new investments has generally been even higher, at around 10 percent. This may suggest that
Dutch firms have been active investors in Japan in recent years, while large divestments (not
included in the cumulative MOF data) have led to low levels of net FDI recorded in Dutch
stock figures and balance of payments data. It should however be noted that MOF figures may
exaggerate Dutch firms' FDI because the figures include investments by holding companies
and financial subsidiaries established in the Netherlands primarily because of its
advantageous tax regime for such activities.24
Trade data also provide a piece of evidence on the role of Dutch firms in Japanese
markets. Here the picture is rather bleak. Only 1.1 percent of Dutch trade went to Japan in
1995, reason for the Dutch government to initiate an 'export to Japan' campaign with the
establishment of a Japan Export Council (JAPTA) [MITI (1996)].25 The Netherlands was
responsible for a mere 0.6 percent of total Japanese imports, a share which should be
                                         
22 The distribution of the FDI stock in Japan over sectors was as follows: 1173 million in manufacturing and 120
million in trade and services. FDI stocks calculated by DNB incorporate reinvested earnings and are adjusted for
revaluations.
23 Perhaps this is so because of the historical presence in Japan of the UK arm Shell Transport & Trading.
24 Examples are SGS-Thomson and Pirelli. MOF does not correct for FDI by such financial subsidiaries, but
DNB does [Van Nieuwkerk (1988)]. On the other hand, MOF figures also exlude FDI by Shell UK.
25 In contrast, more than 4 percent of Japanese trade goes to the Netherlands, which is partly due to the
importance of the Netherlands as a base for European distribution activities.
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considered low for the sixth trading nation in the world. By industry, the Dutch import share
reached a maximum of 1.6 percent for chemical products.
In summary, FDI statistics suggest a very limited presence of Dutch firms in Japan, but
measurement and definition problems suggest that they hide more than they reveal. The next
paragraph examines survey data on foreign MNEs in Japan as an alternative source of
information.
3.2 Characteristics of Dutch MNEs' Operations in Japan: Survey Data
Survey data on foreign firms in Japan can give an indication of the importance of Dutch
FDI across industries and show characteristics of the operations of Dutch affiliates. Table 3
presents MITI survey figures on the number of subsidiaries, the value of total assets, the
number of employees and sales of Dutch affiliates in 1994. Given the 50 percent response
ratio of the survey and the fact that response rates may differ across industries and countries,
due caution should be exercised in interpreting the results. The share of Dutch firms in total
inward investment in terms of number of employees and sales is about half the share based on
the MOF data: 4 and 3.6 percent, respectively. The 63 Dutch affiliates responding to the
survey had total assets of 288 billion Yen (roughly 2.5 billion US$ at 1994 exchange rates).
The affiliates employed 6724 personnel and had sales of 480 billion Yen. The largest number
of employees is recorded in the electrical and electronics industry, which is to be attributed to
the presence of Philips. Other manufacturing industries with relatively high employment
figures are chemicals and pharmaceuticals, but here US and other European MNEs are large
investors as well and Dutch firms are not responsible for an above average share of inward
FDI. The high share of Dutch employment in the wood & furniture industry is more likely to
be a classification error. It is again clear from the figures that Shell does not report as a Dutch
MNE.26 What does appear a robust finding is a higher than average share reported for the
distribution sector (which includes general trading firms as well as trading arms of industrial
firms) and a substantial share for 'other non-manufacturing' (including ING and ABN-AMRO
in banking & insurance and Nedlloyd in transport).27
INSERT TABLE 3
                                         
26 The operations of Unilever would appear not be included in the figures either.
27 In the rather unhelpful MITI classification, mining, construction, banking & insurance, transport, real estate,
telecommunications and utilities are grouped under 'other non-manufacturing', while leasing, software &
information services, advertising, consultancy, and the leisure sector are grouped under 'services'.
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The survey data also allow for a preliminary analysis of profitability and import and
export behaviour. The available information is presented in Table 4. Overall, Dutch
manufacturing affiliates are profitable: on average they reported a ratio of operating profits to
sales of 2.8 percent in 1994. Most manufacturing industries, with the exception of general
machinery and 'other manufacturing' reported profits, with chemicals, pharmaceuticals and
electronics responsible for the highest earnings. This finding corresponds well with figures for
the whole population of foreign-affiliated firms in Japan, which indicate that foreign firms on
average earn higher profits than Japanese firms in the same industry [MITI (1995a)]. It may
be that the difficulties in penetrating the Japanese market have led to a concentration of
investments by the world's strongest multinationals, able to exploit their intangible assets
profitably in Japan. It may also indicate, however, that there is a reluctance among foreign
multinationals to make strategic investments in Japan and incur losses in initial years to build
up a market presence in the long term. As for non-manufacturing industries, Dutch affiliates in
the 'non-manufacturing' and 'service' sectors were also profitable, but distribution affiliates
were on average loss making in 1994.28
INSERT TABLE 4
Table 4 also shows export intensities and import intensities (the ratio of imports to sales)
and the contribution of Dutch MNEs to Japan's trade balance. Unfortunately, export and
import data are no longer recorded separately for Dutch affiliates in the 1994 survey and had
to be drawn from the 1991 survey instead. The 1991 survey only included affiliates in which
foreign firms had a stake of 50 percent or more and it had a response rate of 52 percent. The
export intensity figures show that not all manufacturing ventures are set up to serve the
Japanese market: Dutch manufacturing affiliates on average exported 23.5 percent of
turnover. This figure is mainly a result of the high export ratio for the electronics and
precision machinery industries. In the former industry, Philips has a 50 percent stake in a
publicly quoted audio and video manufacturer, Marantz, which exports a substantial share of
it output to Europe and the United States. The export ratio in machinery industries reflects
Japan's strength in these sectors. Dutch firms use their manufacturing presence not only to
access the Japanese market, but also to learn from Japanese firms' strengths, to establish
linkages with components suppliers and the local R&D infrastructure, and to develop
products for export markets. Perhaps more surprising is the 24 percent export ratio reported
by distribution affiliates. This appears to be due to the presence of distribution arms of
manufacturing firms such as Philips Japan, which are also active in procurement of machinery
                                         
28 This appears not to be a persistent characteristic of FDI in this sector: the 1991 survey showed a profit ratio of
3.4 percent. For a number of other industries as well, 1991 figures were very different from 1994 figures:
pharmaceuticals reported a loss in 1991 and general machinery a profit ratio of 18.4 percent [MITI (1992, 71)].
20
and components for export to subsidiaries world-wide. It is more difficult to explain the high
export ratio for the 'non-manufacturing' sector.
The import to sales ratio of Dutch affiliates reached 18 percent in 1991, 6 percent points
lower than the export ratio. The only industries which relied strongly on imported goods and
materials were chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Distribution affiliates reported a surprisingly
low import to sales ratio of 20 percent. The result is that Dutch affiliates contributed to
Japan's trade surplus in 1991. All affiliates together exported 58 billion Yen more than they
imported. The electronics industry is the main contributor to this surplus (36 billion Yen), but
the distribution sector also shows a substantial surplus (28 billion Yen). This trade behaviour
of Dutch affiliates differs markedly from the trade behaviour of all responding foreign-
affiliated firms. All foreign subsidiaries taken together reported substantially greater import
than export figures in 1991 as well as in 1994, both in manufacturing and distribution. In
1994 the trade deficit by foreign affiliates was more than 2 trillion Yen (roughly 16 billion
US$). Dutch MNEs appear uncharacteristic in the sense that they have much less utilised
investments in manufacturing and distribution to increase market access and to promote
imports of intermediates and final goods into Japan. This finding, it should again be
mentioned, would probably have been altered substantially had the affiliates of Shell been
included in the figures.
The 1991 survey also contains figures on the direction of exports and the origin of
imports. These give an indication of the effect of Dutch affiliates' trade behaviour on the
bilateral trade balance between the Netherlands and Japan. The available information is
presented in Table 5. No separate trade figures are available for the Netherlands, but the
Netherlands is expected to be responsible for a large share of bilateral trade by the 'other
Europe' group (European countries other than the UK, Germany, France, and Switzerland).
For Dutch manufacturing affiliates, Europe was the most important destination of exports but
the difference with Asia and North America was not that large. Since Europe was the primary
source of imports the result is a trade deficit of the affiliates with Europe as a whole.
However, this trade deficit only concerns trade with the group of four European countries,
whilst the trade balance with other European countries including the Netherlands shows a
surplus. Similar observations can be made for the trade behaviour of Dutch distribution
affiliates: here a trade deficit with the four European countries is surpassed by a trade surplus
with the rest of Europe. Hence, it is likely that manufacturing and distribution investment by
Dutch firms in Japan have increased the Dutch trade deficit with Japan.29
                                         
29 This is only to an extent due to the 'gateway' function of the Netherlands. Although the fact that exports to
'other Europe' are relatively high is consistent with such an explanation, at the same time imports from 'other
Europe' are low relative to imports from the large European countries.
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3.3 Dutch Licensing in Japan by Industry
The distribution of licensing contracts across industries and the share of Dutch firms in
foreign firms' licensing activity in Japan are indicators of the technological and marketing
strengths of Dutch firms. Licensing contracts with Japanese firms are notified to the Bank of
Japan if the value of the contract exceeds 3 million Yen.30 The Science and Technology
Agency (STA) and its affiliated research institute, the National Institute for Science and
Technology Policy (NISTEP) publish a yearly report with key statistics based on these
notifications. The licensing contracts concern the transfer of rights for using know-how and
patented technology, designs, trademarks, and technical guidance. Both contracts with
independent Japanese firms and foreign-affiliated firms in Japan are included. The statistics
can potentially be used to show the extent to which foreign firms exploit intangible assets in
Japan internally (in their own subsidiaries) or externally (selling exploitation rights to
independent Japanese firms). A few remarks are necessary for a correct interpretation of the
data. First, BOJ's definition of a licensing contract in practice implies that all software,
including commodity software packages (e.g. operating software such as UNIX), is included.
As a result, more than half of all the licensing contracts in 1994 (1629 out of 3161) concern
software, and most of these are mass produced software packages sold to large institutions
[Yoshimi 1993, 31)]. One could well argue that the sale of such software packages does not
constitute the exploitation of know-how, brand name, or technological advantage, but should
rather be included on the trade balance as the sale of commodities. Second, only statistics on
the number of contracts are published and there are substantial differences in the value
represented by individual contracts. Third, contracts apply for a varying number of years and
statistics on new contracts and contract renewals do not necessarily reflect total licensing
activity. This latter point is not likely to bias the figures much, since both the number of
licensing contracts from the Netherlands (about 80) and the share of the Netherlands in total
licensing (about 3 percent) has been remarkably stable throughout the 1990s [NISTEP
(1996)].
With the above considerations in mind, Table 6 presents data on the number of new and
renewed licensing contracts concluded in 1994 with licensors based in the Netherlands, and
compares the numbers with the total number of contracts from all licensor countries. The
                                         
30 In a few areas, such as space technology and weaponry, licensing deals have to be approved by the Japanese
government. In the other cases there is only an ex-post reporting requirement.
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number of contracts is desaggregated by product. Firms and individuals in the Netherlands
concluded 89 licensing contracts in 1994, which represented 2.8 percent of total licensing
contracts signed by residents in Japan with foreign firms. The majority of contracts from all
countries concerned computers & software (1740), a figure which is heavily influenced by the
sale of commodity software. In case of Dutch licensing, the share of computers & software
only reached 21 percent. If one excluded the licenses classified under software and computers
than the Dutch share in the total number of contracts would be nearer to 5 percent. The
distribution of Dutch licenses over product groups is heavily concentrated in the electrical and
electronics sector: apart form computers and software, a relatively large number of contracts is
classified under radio & television and VCRs & medical equipment. As will become clear in
paragraph 4.2, this pattern arises because the electronics group Philips dominates Dutch
licensing activity in Japan. The other important product group is general machinery (18
percent of contracts) and chemical machinery in particular. Dutch strengths in chemical
manufacturing take the form of process technologies and advances in chemical machinery
which are exploited in Japan; product-related chemical technologies take an extra 4.5 percent
of contracts. Comparing the number of Dutch licenses with the total number by product group
confirms the strengths in radio & television, VCRs & medical equipment, and chemical
machinery. Other product groups with higher than average licensing activity are food, rubber,
sports articles & music, plastic products and building materials. Although not too much
weight can be attached to the latter numbers since they are influenced by the very limited
licensing activity in general in these product groups, they appear consistent with perceived
strengths of Dutch firms in chemical related industries (rubber and plastics), process
industries such as food and building materials, and music (Philips subsidiary Polygram).
INSERT TABLE 6
The licensing data have in common with the FDI data that they include contracts by a
number of holding companies and financial subsidiaries established by foreign firms in the
Netherlands, which use the Dutch entity to collect the licensing proceeds. On the other hand,
the figures do not include licensing contracts signed by Shell and Unilever in the UK and the
US subsidiaries of large Dutch MNEs. Also, the 1994 figures in Table 6 cannot be
distinguished between intra-firm and arm's length licensing. In paragraph 4.2, both these
issues are addressed by examining the available data on individual firms' licensing contracts.
4. Dutch FDI and Licensing at the Firm Level
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In both the MITI survey data and the FDI data in Paragraph 3.1, the hypothesis of a
relatively strong Dutch investment position in Japan is not supported. However, it was also
suggested that this may be due to statistical definitions and data imperfections. Micro data on
individual Dutch MNEs' investment and licensing activities in Japan are most revealing of
Dutch firms' status in Japanese industries. Paragraph 4.1 presents extensive data on Dutch
MNEs' subsidiaries in Japan in 1995 and discusses recent developments. Paragraph 4.2 looks
at the pattern of licenses sold by Dutch firms in Japan.
4.1 Main Subsidiaries of Dutch MNEs in Japan
A detailed picture of Dutch MNEs' presence in Japan can be obtained from data published
by Toyo Keizai (1995). This publisher conducts a yearly survey among foreign-affiliated firms
in Japan. The 1995 survey among 3432 firms had a response ratio of 86 percent. This
compares to a response ratio of MITI's 1994 survey of 50 percent to a questionnaire which
effectively reached only 2307 firms. The 86 percent figure still underestimates the coverage of
the survey, since non-responses were also due to withdrawals and because the figures were
supplemented with information from news reports and other sources. In contrast with the
MITI data, Toyo Keizai's coverage can be considered as near complete. The 1995 survey
included firms with paid-in capital exceeding 5 million Yen and foreign ownership of at least
50 percent, but the latter threshold was reduced to 20 percent for larger and publicly quoted
firms. Table 7 presents key information on most subsidiaries of Dutch MNEs in Japan, based
on Toyo Keizai's data and supplemented by a number of other sources and newspaper reports
[Dodwell (1988, 1993, 1994)), Keizai Chousakai (1994), Toyo Keizai (1995), Dun &
Bradstreet (1996)]. The Table first lists the subsidiaries of the 'big five' Dutch industrial
MNEs with substantial operations in Japan. Ranked by sales in Japan these are Shell, Philips,
Unilever, Akzo-Nobel, and DSM. The table continues by listing the main subsidiaries of other
Dutch MNEs. If available, information is included on the Dutch investor's equity stake, the
equity stake by the Japanese partner, year of establishment or acquisition, capitalisation,
sales, declared taxable income, number of employees, imports as a percentage of total
procurement, export intensity, function of the subsidiary (manufacturing, distribution, import,
export) and lines of business.31 It should be noted that the listing is not exhaustive: a number
of smaller subsidiaries established by the larger firms (Shell in particular) are not included
and neither are a number of smaller Dutch MNEs operating distribution subsidiaries in Japan.
                                         
31 It is not always clear whether the sales figures reported by Toyo Keizai are on consolidated or unconsolidated
basis. In particular in the former case, adding up sales figures will generate an inflated figure for total Japanese
sales of the MNE. Employment figures are usually on an unconsolidated basis and may be added up with fewer
reservations.
24
Shell
Shell has by far the largest presence in Japan among Dutch MNEs, both in absolute as in
relative (market share) terms. Shell Transport and Trading, the English predecessor of the
Shell group, set up a subsidiary in Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century and was
one of the first foreign firms to establish a presence in Japan. Over time, the Shell group has
grown into the third largest fully integrated oil company in Japan. Shell's activities are
organised around two core companies: Showa Shell Sekiyu and Shell Japan. Showa Shell
Sekiyu was created through the 1985 merger of Shell Sekiyu and Showa Sekiyu, both
controlled by Shell at the time. Shell maintains a 50 percent stake in the company mainly
through Shell UK. It effectively controls Showa Shell since the remaining shares are held in
relatively small lots by various investors. Showa Shell had consolidated sales of 1.3 trillion
Yen (more than 12 billion US$) in 1994 and is involved in oil exploration, refining, storage,
transportation, distribution and research, while it has also diversified into car rental, software,
and real estate. It operates five refineries and 7100 petrol service stations in Japan and has its
own marine fleet [Dodwell (1994)]. It is the fifth refiner in Japan and the third gasoline
distributor with 12.5 percent of the market [Nihon Keizai Sangyo Shinbun (1996)]. Showa
Shell has organised its own vertical keiretsu of 82 subsidiaries and 40 affiliates in different
businesses such as exploration (Shoseki Oil Development), distribution (Shoseki Gas,
Shoseki Shoji), oil refining (Toa Oil, Showa Yokkaichi Sekiyu), transport (Showa Shell
Sempaku), construction (Shoseki Engineering), and production of petrochemicals (Shoseki
Kako, Nippon Grease). Showa Shell is also a member of a horizontal keiretsu, the Dai Ichi
Kangyo Group, but ties to the group are judged to be relatively weak. Shell's other core
subsidiary, Shell Japan, is fully owned by Shell UK and is mainly involved in import,
manufacturing and distribution of (petro)chemicals. In 1986, Shell Japan set up a joint
venture with Siemens to manufacture solar batteries and solar panels. The total number of
employees in Shell subsidiaries, including subsidiaries not listed in Table 7, would easily
surpass 6000. Since Shell UK is the investor in both Showa Shell and Shell Japan, none of
Shell's investments in Japan enter Dutch FDI statistics. Even in UK statistics, FDI figures are
not likely to reflect the size of Shell's operations in Japan very well since most of the
investments are by Showa Shell which operates by and large as a Japanese company using
equity finance (it is listed at the Tokyo Stock Exchange) as well as local loans to finance its
operations.
Shell also had a minority stake in Mitsubishi Oil's subsidiary Mitsubishi Petrochemical,
the largest all-round petrochemical maker in Japan. In 1994, Mitsubishi Petrochemical and
Mitsubishi Kasei merged to form Mitsubishi Chemical in which Shell maintains a 4 percent
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stake. Cooperation with Mitsubishi Oil is likely to increase. In 1997, Mitsubishi Oil and
Showa Shell unveiled plans to merge their refining business, which would create Japan's
largest refiner with sales of 16 billion US$.32 The merger activity follows increasing
competition in the Japanese oil industry, which was deregulated in 1996, ending the limitation
of import licenses to 29 existing refiners and wholesalers. In the face of declining profitability
of operations, US oil distributor Caltex pulled out of its oil refining and distribution joint
venture with Nippon Oil. Shell, on the other hand, has shown a commitment to the market and
through its strong distribution and marketing arm is well-placed to survive the shakeout in the
industry.
Philips
Philips is the second Dutch investor in Japan in terms of sales and number of employees.
Until 1993 it had been the largest investor due to its 35 percent stake in a joint venture with
Matsushita, Matsushita Electronics Corporation (MEC), involved in semiconductor, lighting,
and cathode ray tube manufacturing. MEC in 1992 employed 22,000 of which 18,000 in
Japan. It had semiconductor sales of 1.93 billion US$ and was the world's tenth largest
semiconductor producer. MEC was responsible for 15 percent of turnover of the Matsushita
group which is Japan's and the world's largest consumer electronics manufacturer. Philips had
set up the joint venture with Matsushita in 1952, because Japan's restrictive legislation on
inward investment precluded the establishment of a majority owned manufacturing base.
Philips provided MEC with technology for cathode ray tubes and lighting, but MEC's
operations remained limited to manufacturing and played no role in increasing penetration of
Philips-branded products in Japan. Over time, Matsushita obtained equal or superior
technological capabilities in a substantial number of MEC's product lines. Discord arose
between Philips and Matsushita on how to implement MEC's overseas expansion, in
particular over semiconductor sales and production in the US (where Philips subsidiary
Signetics is manufacturing) and cathode ray tube production in China and Europe (where
Philips also has its own manufacturing plants). In 1993, Philips, which was troubled by a
large debt burden and was in the midst of a painful rationalisation process, indicated it would
prefer to pull out of the venture. Matsushita eventually agreed to buy out Philips' stake for
185 billion Yen (about 1.65 billion US$). The buyout left Matsushita free to pursue its own
strategy abroad and to compete head-on with Philips outside Japan, while it left Philips free to
                                         
32 Financial Times, 17 February 1997.
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pursue a more independent sales strategy in Japan.33 Philips and Matsushita maintained
technological links and cross-licensing agreements after the buyout.
Philips also established Philips Japan in the 1950s as a majority owned joint venture with
Matsushita. Philips Japan handles imports and distribution of lighting, semiconductors, and
small electric appliances. It is also in charge of staffing for Philips subsidiaries in Japan,
licensing agreements, and procurement of components and OEM products for Philips factories
and distribution subsidiaries overseas. Philips Japan had sales of 117 billion Yen (more than
1 billion US$) in 1994 but this figure may include procurement in Japan for export. In the late
1980s, Philips acquired Matsushita's remaining stake in the subsidiary.
Philips' major manufacturing subsidiary in Japan is the upmarket audio manufacturer
Marantz, listed at the Tokyo Stock Exchange and with a turnover of 44 billion Yen (about
400 million US$) in 1995. Philips acquired a 50 percent (but controlling) stake in Marantz in
1981 and Marantz has since entered the video equipment market in 1987 (in particular LCD
televisions) as well as the telecommunication markets. Including its Japanese manufacturing
subsidiaries Standard Communications and Miyako Audio, Marantz employs 1500 in Japan.
Marantz is Philips' manufacturing and R&D base in Japan for audio and video products, but
it is exporting a sizeable share of sales abroad and Philips remains an undistinguished player
in the Japanese audio and video markets.34
Apart from Philips Japan, Philips operates two specialised distribution subsidiaries in
Japan. Philips Medical Systems sells diagnostic imaging systems to Japanese hospitals. It had
a 1991 turnover of 22 billion Yen (roughly 150 million US$). Philips is the third largest
seller of this type of medical equipment in the world and has managed to obtain a significant
market share in Japan. Signetics Japan sells semiconductors and was acquired by Philips
through a takeover of US semiconductor manufacturer Signetics. Philips also has
semiconductor manufacturing machinery operations in Japan: majority-owned Philips
subsidiary ASM manufacturers and sells steppers (etching equipment) for semiconductor
manufacturing. This venture again appears to benefit from Japanese manufacturing strengths
in semiconductor machinery: operations are not import intensive but of 20 percent of sales is
exported.
                                         
33 See Nikkei Weekly 3 May 1993 and Financial Times 1 May 1993. In 1994 Matsushita acquired a cathode ray
tube plant of Nokia in Germany and began production in Europe. Until 1994, Matsushita had relied on tube
deliveries from Philips plants in Europe for its European television manufacturing operations.
34 It has even been reported that Philips would discontinue marketing of consumer electronics products in Japan
altogether. Financial Times 14 January 1997.
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Philips has been active in extending its manufacturing and marketing presence in Japan.
In 1992, it acquired the 70 percent stake which GTE (US) held in a Japanese lighting
manufacturer, Kondo Sylvania.35 Kondo Sylvania specialises in halogen lamps for studios and
optical equipment and has appreciated marketing and technological capabilities. Philips later
increased its stake to 100 percent and renamed the company Philips Lighting. Philips
Lighting employed 237 in 1995 and had sales of 4.7 billion Yen (about 45 million US$). All
sales are to Philips Japan which handles distribution of its products in Japan and abroad. As
with Marantz, the company is export intensive and sells about 40 percent of turnover abroad
through Philips Japan.
Philips has also set up a number of (smaller) manufacturing and software joint ventures
with Japanese firms. PNN, a joint venture with Nippon Steel and Nippon Chemicon,
manufactures ceramic semiconductor packages, Philips Sensor Technology (with Nihon LCR)
manufacturers sensors, and Nihon Micromotor (with Foster Electric) manufactures
micromotors. Denshi Media Services (with Toppan Printing) and Kyocera and Philips
Datanet (with Kyocera) design software. In addition, Philips has business and equity links
with two Japanese electronics firms listed at the Tokyo Stock Exchange (not in Table 7):
Philips has a small (4.4 percent) stake in Foster Electric (a manufacturer of speakers and
microphones) and it has strong business and technical ties with Teikoku Tsushin (a resistor
manufacturer) with which it established a manufacturing joint venture in Holland in 1989.
Philips' largest presence in Japan is in music sales. Majority owned subsidiary Polygram
operates a number of subsidiaries in Japan engaged in music production, CD manufacturing,
and music distribution. Polygram KK is the largest with 1994 sales of 82 billion Yen (more
than 700 million US$). Polygram has increased its marketing efforts and consolidated its
business in Japan in the 1990s, giving Polygram KK overall management responsibility over
all its Japanese operations. In the early 1990s, Polygram bought out the minority stakes which
Matsushita and Matsushita subsidiary JVC had in Polydor KK and Polygram KK.36 Polygram
is the market leader in music sales world-wide with a 17 percent market share. It has a 13
percent share of the Japanese music market.37
A major new development in Philips' Japanese operations occurred in 1996. Philips set up
a liquid crystal display (LCD) panel joint venture in Japan with Hosiden, an electronics
components maker. Hosiden is one of the smaller players in LCD panel production in Japan
                                         
35 Nikkei Weekly, 2 January 1992.
36 Financial Times, 14 January 1994. Polygram KK has also restructured CD manufacturing operations and was
the first Japanese music producer to relocate all CD production for the Japanese market to Asia in 1995.
37 Financial Times, 9 May 1996.
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and found it difficult as an independent manufacturer to raise the large amounts of capital
necessary to expand production and to secure sales in the increasingly competitive market.
Hosiden had LCD panel production worth 180 million US$ in 1995 and has OEM supply
contracts with both Hitachi and NEC. It put its two manufacturing plants in Japan in the joint
venture. Philips is a relative latecomer in the LCD panel market. It had developed its own
technology to produce diode-based active matrix LCD panels, different from the mainstay thin
film transistor active matrix LCDs produced by the leading Japanese firms and Hosiden.
Philips started mass production of diode LCDs at its Eindhoven based Flat Panel Display
joint venture with Sagem (France), Thomson (France), and Merck (Germany), but has found it
difficult to become a significant player in the world market by internal growth only.38 The
venture with Hosiden will give it the necessary critical mass as well as access to Hosiden's
manufacturing skills in thin film transistor LCDs. Philips reportedly paid Hosiden 2 billion
Yen for use of its technology in Japan and in the Eindhoven plant, which is likely to switch
partly to the mainstay technology.39 The size of Philips' investment in the new venture has not
been disclosed, but is likely to be substantial given the capital requirements of LCD
manufacturing.
A concluding remark on Philips' manufacturing activities in Japan is that an important
part of these, in particular in audio and video, halogen lamps, and LCD panels, are more
related to the benefits of manufacturing derived from Japan's strong supplier base and R&D
skills in these areas than to particularly strong competitive advantages vis-à-vis Japanese
firms. Manufacturing operations have consequently had only limited effects on Philips' market
penetration in Japan until now and Philips remains undistinguished in these sectors. Although
Philips is the world's largest lighting producer, the joint venture agreements with Matsushita
appear to have long precluded it form developing its own marketing strategy in Japan. Philips
does enjoy significant market shares for other products in which it has a marketing and
technological lead: medical diagnostic equipment, music, and small electrical appliances.40
Unilever
                                         
38 The Eindhoven Joint venture was producing 40,000 displays a month at the end of 1995. Financial Times, 12
October 1996.
39 The Nikkei Weekly, 25 November 1996
40 Philips' share of the Japanese coffee maker market in 1992 was 10.8 percent. Philips also held 4.5 percent of
the shaver market in 1992, but was well behind Matsushita (42 percent) and Braun of Germany (24 percent)
[Yano (1994)]. In semiconductors, Philips has been less successful. Its highest share in 1994 was recorded for
digital bipolar integrated circuits at 1.9 percent, in sharp contrast with Philips' world market share for digital
integrated circuits of more than 11 percent. Philips' share in the overall Japanese semiconductor market only
reached 0.37 percent for discrete semiconductors and 0.18 percent for integrated circuits; total sales amounted to
10 billion Yen (about 90 million US$) [Yano (1995)].
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The Anglo-Dutch group Unilever employed about 2000 in Japan in 1995. Group sales
reached 90 billion Yen (about 800 million US$). Unilever's flavouring and aromatic
substance subsidiary Quest International made the first advance in Japan and set up a
subsidiary in 1963. Unilever itself set up a first joint venture with Honen in the same year
(Honen Lever KK) but only later took a majority stake. It assumed full control over the
subsidiary in 1986 and the subsidiary was renamed Nippon Lever. Unilever has since then
committed itself to the Japanese market and has increased its investments and marketing. It
has taken a long term view of its investment and has accepted substantial initial losses on its
Japanese operations: Nippon Lever only turned in its first profit in 1993.41 It operates two tea
manufacturing joint ventures (Japan Black Tea and Lipton Japan) with two of Japan's large
trading houses (Mitsui and Mitsubishi), and has a chemicals manufacturing subsidiary
(Ablestik). A significant advance in Japan was due to Unilever's acquisition drive in the
United States. Unilever acquired the US starch and adhesives maker National Starch and
Chemical in 1987 and toiletries and personal care products maker Elisabeth Arden in 1989.
Both had substantial Japanese operations which came under control of Unilever: Kanebo-
NSC, NSC Japan, and Elisabeth Arden Japan.42 Unilever has carved out significant market
shares in Japan in a number of products. After acquiring a margarine brand from Ajinomoto
in 1993, it became the second largest margarine producer in Japan with 25 percent of the
market. Unilever also has 7 percent of the shampoo market but has been less successful in the
detergent market with a 4 percent share (well behind US rival Proctor and Gamble with a 20
percent share [Nihon Keizai Sangyo Shinbun (1996)].
Akzo-Nobel
AKZO predecessor Organon established a first subsidiary in Japan in 1960, a joint
venture with pharmaceutical maker Sankyo engaged in production, import, and distribution of
pharmaceuticals. Nippon Organon was still the largest subsidiary of the Akzo-Nobel group in
Japan in 1995, with 260 employees and 13 billion Yen (about 120 million US$) in sales.
Akzo-Nobel operates a large number of manufacturing joint ventures and distribution
subsidiaries in Japan, each involved in one of the group's different lines of business. Wholly
owned Akzo-Nobel KK imports, manufactures, and distributes fine chemicals and is also
engaged in R&D. Three other wholly owned subsidiaries, Akzo Nobel Coatings (car paints),
Organon Teknika and Nihon Akzo Pharma (both pharmaceuticals) are engaged in import and
                                         
41 Financial Times, 7 May 1992 and 23 February 1994.
42 In a recent development, Unilever sold its speciality chemicals division, including Quest and National Starch
and Chemical, to UK chemicals group ICI. Financial Times, 8 May 1997.
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distribution. Two more distribution subsidiaries and seven manufacturing subsidiaries are all
joint ventures with local firms. Two joint ventures with Tosoh, Tosoh Akzo and Akzo
Kashima, manufacture calcium and titanium, and sulphur and phosphates, respectively. Akzo-
Nobel has important business linkages with Tosoh and also operates an ethylene
manufacturing joint venture with the Japanese firms in the Netherlands. Akzo's stake in Tosoh
Akzo was acquired in 1987 through a takeover of the speciality chemicals division of US firm
Stauffer. Akzo Nobel also manufactures catalysts for oil refining in a joint venture with
Sumitomo Metal Mining. This joint venture, Nippon Ketjen, supplies all major refiners in
Japan and reportedly has a 35 market share [Toyo Keizai (1995)]. The joint venture with
Denki Kagaku Kogyo, Denak, is the largest manufacturer in Japan of monochloroacetic acids.
Akzo Nobel manufactures organic peroxide with Nihon Kayaku (Kayaku Akzo), acid
derivatives with Lion (Lion Akzo), and paints with Toa Paint (Toa Akzo Coatings). It sells its
proprietary aramide fibre through a joint venture with Sumitomo Chemical (Nippon Aramid),
plastics through a joint venture with Dainippon Ink and Chemicals (Nihon Interstab), and
additives for paper processing industries through a joint venture with Nissan Kagaku (Nissan
Eka Nobel).
DSM
DSM is the latest entrant to the Japanese market among the largest five Dutch industrial
MNEs. It set up its first joint venture in Japan with Japan Synthetic Rubber, Japan Fine
Coatings, only in 1982. By 1995 DSM operated at least seven subsidiaries in Japan. With the
exception of wholly owned DSM Japan, which has relatively small operations, none of the
subsidiaries is majority owned. The largest subsidiary in terms of sales and employment,
Nippon Polypenco, came under control of DSM through DSM's acquisition of US
manufacturer Polymer (US) in 1989. DSM also makes synthetic rubber with Idemitsu
Petrochemical (DSM Idemitsu), fibres and resins with Sankyo Toatsu (MD Composites),
polystyrene with Toyobo (Nihon Dyneema), and resins with U-Pica (U-Pica DSM Resins).
Other Dutch Industrial MNEs
Besides the large five Dutch MNEs, there are only three other Dutch MNEs with
manufacturing operations in Japan. Aluminium producer Hunter Douglas operates two joint
ventures in Japan which engage in import, manufacturing, and distribution. It produces
aluminium panels with Sankyo Aluminium (Hunter Douglas Japan) and blinds with Sekisui
Resin (Hunter Douglas Window Fashions) and operates a wholly owned distribution
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subsidiary (Hunter Douglas Metals Japan) as well. Packaging materials group Van Leer has
been active in Japan since 1963 (Tri Sure Japan) but until recently did not manufacture in
Japan. In 1996 this situation changed when Van Leer invested 34 million US$ in greenfield
manufacturing operations for its mainstay steel drums. It aims to manufacture 1 million drums
a year and capture 8 percent of the Japanese market. A major customer will be the Shell
group, which Van Leer supplies in other parts of the world as well. Although Van Leer is the
world's largest producer of steel drums for the oil and chemical industries and has an
extensive network of manufacturing plants world-wide, it has until now not been able to sell
significant numbers in Japan. The company cited difficulties in entering the Japanese market,
which is dominated by the affiliates of the large Japanese steel makers. It apparently was not
able to forge a link with a steel products manufacturer because of pressure from the large
Japanese steel suppliers and has had to keep the source of steel supplies for the new plant
secret.43 A number of other Dutch firms operate distribution subsidiaries in Japan. Heineken
has a joint venture with Japanese market leader Kirin Beer. Heineken Japan had a turnover of
2.9 billion Yen (roughly 25 million US$) in 1994. Heineken has changed its strategy in Japan
in the early 1990s. Until 1993, Kirin was the sole distributor of Heineken beer and was
producing Heineken beer under license. From 1993, Heineken has shifted to imports to
bypass high production costs in Japan, has renegotiated the distribution contract with Kirin,
and has started a marketing campaign targeting a doubling of sales in 1995 [Toyo Keizai
(1995)]. Instrument manufacturer Delft instruments, machinery manufacturer Stork, and dairy
products manufacturer Friesland Frico Domo are among the Dutch MNEs with sales
subsidiaries in Japan. Friesland Frico Domo has the largest operations and has also licensed
production of cheese to Japanese manufacturers. According to Dun and Bradstreet (1996),
subsidiaries are also operated by machinery manufacturer Greenland, steel manufacturer
Hoogovens, chemical firm Norit, paper and packaging group BT-KNP, and engineering firm
Fugro (not in Table 7).
MNEs in Services
The largest Dutch financial group, the Internationale Nederlanden Group (ING), has built
up substantial operations in Japan since entering the market in 1984. In 1984 it established
Nationale Nederlanden Life Insurance. It obtained a license to sell life insurance policies from
MOF in 1986. It has gradually increased sales in Japan and in 1995 employed 363 in its life
insurance subsidiary. Its banking subsidiary in Japan, ING Bank, has assets of 275 billion
Yen (2.5 billion US$) and employs 71. In addition, in 1996 it acquired the securities and
investment banking group Barings in the United Kingdom and took control over Barings'
                                         
43 Financial Times, 7 November 1996.
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Japanese operations (not in Table 7). The other major Dutch banking group, ABN-Amro
employs 150 in Japan. Its banking subsidiary has substantial assets totalling 1186 billion Yen
(about 10 billion US$). In 1997 it boosted its securities trading and investment banking
business in Japan by acquiring the stock brokering license of a Japanese security dealer and
ABN-Amro is planning to increase its activities in this area substantially. In the transport
sector, Dutch shipping firm Nedlloyd operates one of the larger subsidiaries in Japan with
140 employees, and a second subsidiary with 30 employees. Nedlloyd is likely to increase its
presence in Japan after it merged its international shipping business with P&O, creating the
world's largest shipping group. Dutch international trading firms Borsumij Wehry, Van
Ommeren, and Hagemeyer all operate trading subsidiaries in Japan. Borsumij Wehry set up
its main subsidiary in Japan, Geo Wehry International, as early as 1955 and employs 47. The
subsidiary specialises in the import business and is not exporting from Japan. Reed Elsevier
has publishing operations in Japan for professional and academic medical journals, in which
the group is world leader. The most recent entry in Japan is by fast expanding business
software house Baan, which set up a subsidiary in 1995 employing 39. In addition, the Dutch
privatised telecommunications and postal services provider KPN gained a foothold in Japan
through its acquisition of Australia's TNT. TNT, a major provider of international parcel and
mail service for businesses, operated a subsidiary (TNT World-wide Express Japan) with 290
employees in Japan in 1995.
Apart from the two main financial groups and Nedlloyd, the presence of Dutch MNEs
other than the large five industrial concerns is very limited. Indeed a large number of Dutch
MNEs with substantial operations in Europe and North America are entirely or almost
entirely absent from Japan. The list includes food and drink manufacturers Bols Wessanen,
Meneba, and Nutricia, chemical and pharmaceutical producer Gist Brocades, copier and
printing machinery manufacture Océ van der Grinten, retail and wholesale groups Vendex,
Ahold, and SHV, transport firms Internatio Muller and Pakhoed, construction firms Ballast
Nedam, HBG, Boskalis and Volker Stevin, publishers Kluwer and VNU, and financial group
Fortis.44
Concluding Remarks
The evidence in this paragraph has revealed a number of features of the operations of
Dutch MNEs in Japan. These operations are much more extensive than FDI flow and stock
                                         
44 Building group Ballast Nedam set up a subsidiary with Penta Ocean Construction to develop business in
underwater construction in 1980 but this subsidiary appears to have been liquidated. Similarly, a pharmaceuticals
joint venture between Gist Brocades and Chugai set up in 1984 is no longer recorded in the listings provided by
Dun and Bradstreet (1996) and Toyo Keizai (1995).
33
data suggest. As predicted, Dutch operations in Japan are dominated by the largest five
MNEs: these firms were responsible for more than 90 percent of the 12,000 employees in
Dutch controlled subsidiaries identified in Table 7. The dominance of the largest firms is
much stronger compared with Dutch FDI in Europe or North America where the 'second tier'
Dutch MNEs have made substantial advances as well. Many of the smaller MNEs have
ignored the Japanese market. In fact, even a large part of the Japanese expansion of Akzo-
Nobel, Unilever, and DSM has been a by-product of their acquisition drive in the United
States. Although the Japanese interests of these US acquisitions are likely to have played a
role in their investment decisions, it shows that Dutch firms generally have not focused their
international expansion strategy on Japan. The Dutch investment pattern reflects the historical
and present barriers to inward investment and the difficulty of direct acquisitions in particular,
as described in Section 2. Only Shell with its historic presence in Japan has been able to
expand its Japanese business in the immediate post war years, because Japan needed to secure
oil supplies and this necessitated close cooperation with the leading oil companies. Philips, in
contrast, was forced to enter into a minority joint venture with its later rival Matsushita and
this has not helped it much in increasing its market presence in Japan.
The investment patterns show important differences in market entry strategi s of the larger
MNEs. DSM and Akzo-Nobel operate a range of manufacturing joint ventures with Japanese
partners. The joint ventures aim to sell in Japan but also often function as an export platform
for Asian markets. Unilever operates wholly or majority owned subsidiaries and has invested
in distribution and marketing to increase market share of its branded products in Japan.
Philips' strategy is to create stronger links with the Japanese electronics manufacturing base
and to benefit from Japanese R&D and manufacturing strengths. It has acquired stakes in
three Japanese companies with important technological and design expertise and has set up a
number of high technology joint ventures as well. A high share of its manufacturing output in
Japan is sold in Europe and North America. Another observation is that in areas in which
Dutch firms are world market leaders, they have often set up manufacturing or have
distribution affiliates in Japan which have captured a significant share of the Japanese market.
Shell is the best example; others are Philips in small electrical appliances, diagnostic
equipment and music, Akzo-Nobel in monochloroacetic acids and catalysts for oil refining,
Unilever in margarine, Elsevier in medical journals, and only very recently, Van Leer in steel
drums. Finally, Dutch firms are also reaping benefits from the greater opportunities for
foreign firms in the Japanese market in the mid 1990s. Philips has succeeded in two
acquisitions and has bought out Japanese partners in a number of majority ventures, Shell is
planning a merger to become the largest oil refiner in Japan and to consolidate its integrated
oil business in the wake of deregulation, and Baan and Van Leer made new entries in Japan.
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4.2 Licensing Contracts by Individual Dutch MNEs
Licensing data may throw further light on strategies of Dutch firms in Japan. By
distinguishing between intra-firm licensing contracts and arm's length contracts, it is possible
to determine the role of internalisation versus externalisation of intangible assets. The STA in
the past has published a yearly volume containing licensing data by foreign licensor and
Japanese licensee. Unfortunately stopped the publication of individual contract was
discontinued in 1987. In this paragraph, the licensing behaviour of Dutch multinationals in
Japan is examined during the last five-year period for which contracts data are available
1981-1986. Despite the time lag, these data reveal long term differences in firm strategies
which complement the findings based on subsidiary data.
During the five year period 1981-1986, MOF recorded 180 licensing contracts between
Dutch firms and resident firms in Japan. In addition, during 1981-1986, 50 extra licenses
were sold by foreign subsidiaries of Dutch MNEs, mainly located in the UK and US. The
number of 180 Dutch licenses, on the other hand, included about 30 licenses by foreign
holding companies in the Netherlands. The Dutch subsidiary of US biotechnology firm
Biogen was responsible for 12 more licenses. As with FDI, Dutch licensing activity was
dominated by the larger MNEs.
Table 8 presents key data on the number and characteristics of licenses by firm. Philips
sold by far the largest number of licenses in Japan: 108 of which 4 by Philips in the US, and
17 by Polygram Germany. Six licenses involved Philips group firms as licensees, of which
three licenses were to Marantz. Among the major licensees were large electronics firms such
as Toshiba and Sanyo Electric. The licenses were strongly concentrated around compact disk
(CD) technology: 7 concerned the disks, 24 the (plastic) cases for the disks, and 39 concerned
CD players. These numbers reflect Philips' hold on a number of major CD patents after
pioneered CD technology with Sony. Licensing in this case not only generates revenue but
also has the important objective to promote standardisation and increase the market potential
of CD hardware and music. The strength of Philips' licensing activity reflects the group's
technological strength in hardware: software (3 licenses) and trademarks (2 licenses, to
Marantz) are much less important.
The second largest licensor is the Shell group with 41 licenses. As with FDI, most of
Shell's activities in Japan are controlled from the UK: Shell Research and Shell International
Petroleum were responsible for 25 licenses. More than half of  the licenses (23) were intra-
firm, reflecting Shell's large and established operations in Japan and a choice to exploit its
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technology in-house. Almost half the licensing activity concerned chemical machinery and
processes and 10 licenses involved petrochemical products.
Unilever's small number of licenses (7) is due to a concentration of activities in low
technology (but marketing intensive) industries. Four of the seven licenses involved tea
processing technology and trademarks from its Lipton subsidiary in the UK. All but one
license was to Unilever firms in Japan. This reflects a long term strategy to build up its market
shares of branded goods by exercising control over its Japanese operations (as seen in the
previous paragraph). Also at considerable distance behind Philips and Shell, Akzo sold 9
licenses in Japan, of which only 1 was a (general know how) license to an Akzo subsidiary
(Lion Akzo). The technologies involved are varied: paint, chemical machinery, rubber
processing technology, and plastics. One trademark was licensed. The licensing pattern of
DSM is similar. There were no intra-firm licenses among the 5 recorded contracts, which is
congruent to DSM's limited presence in Japan in particular in the early 1980s. One other
technology-based Dutch MNE has multiple licensing contracts: pharmaceuticals and yeast
producer Gist Brocades sold 5 licenses in Japan. The firm has chosen to sell its know how
rather than investing in Japan and does not operate a Japanese subsidiary. Other Dutch firms
with licensing activity in Japan include the national air carrier KLM (1), wholesaler SHV (1),
dairy producer Frico Domo (1), glass manufacturer Smit Ovens Nijmegen (3), oil exploration
engineers Marine Structure Consultants (4), machinery manufacturer Stork (1), building
materials manufacturer Schokbeton (1), and engineering firm Fugro (1 license to its Japanese
subsidiary).
5. Conclusions
Dutch multinationals' investment and operations in Japan reflect the particular regulatory
and economic conditions which have affected inward FDI in Japan at large. Japan's level of
inward FDI is low by any standard, though not as low as conventionally used statistics
suggest. There are, however, important differences in foreign penetration across industries,
which are in line with perceived competitive advantages of foreign firms. Another feature of
inward FDI is its concentration in joint ventures as opposed to wholly owned operations and
acquisitions. The main reason for these stylised facts is the legacy of almost three decades of
prohibition and strict regulation of inward investment. Locational disadvantages and a range
of entry barriers affecting foreign and Japanese entrants alike (such as vertical integration of
manufacturers in the distribution sector) have kept inward investment growing at only a low
pace during the 1980s. Deregulation and the prolonged recession of the 1990s have
transformed the investment climate in Japan to an important extent in the mid 1990s, as a
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result of which new FDI and in particular acquisitions by foreign firms, have shown
unprecedented advance.
The persistent barriers to FDI in Japan are likely to have discouraged smaller MNEs with
fewer financial and managerial resources to enter the Japanese market. Consequently one
would expect that Dutch FDI, dominated by five large industrial MNEs with substantial
world-wide resources, would be relatively less affected in Japan. Figures on Dutch FDI flows
and stocks appear to suggest otherwise: they indicate a very limited investment position of
Dutch MNEs in Japan commensurate to limited levels of Dutch exports to Japan. However,
comparison with survey data on foreign-affiliated firms in Japan highlights that FDI figures
give a misleading picture of the extent of Dutch MNEs' operations in Japan, primarily because
bilateral investment flows are not always picking up investments by Dutch firms. Survey data
identify a large number of subsidiaries of Dutch MNEs which in all employ at least 12,000 in
1995. The largest group, Shell, had sales exceeding 12 billion US$ in Japan, but none of the
group's Japanese assets are recorded in Dutch FDI statistics. As expected, Dutch MNEs' FDI
in Japan is dominated by the five largest industrial groups which a share of over 90 percent on
an employment basis. Other MNEs with a significant presence in Japan are shipping firm
Nedlloyd and financial groups ABN-Amro and ING. The operations of Dutch MNEs in Japan
are on the whole profitable, which is in line with the overall performance of foreign-affiliated
firms in Japan. On the other hand, Dutch subsidiaries are uncharacteristic in terms of import
and export behaviour. Survey data suggest that Dutch affiliates export more from Japan than
they import, and there is evidence that this trade imbalance is even larger with the
Netherlands. This is a result of the export intensive Japanese manufacturing operations of a
number of subsidiaries in particular in the electronics and speciality chemicals sectors, and the
fact that affiliates in Japan are also involved in procurement of high technology components
and materials for world-wide operations of Dutch MNEs (in particular in case of Philips).
Statistics on Dutch licensing activity in Japan in 1994 highlight Dutch firms' technological
strengths in chemical machinery and processes and consumer and applied electronics.
Analysis of individual MNEs' subsidiaries and licensing operations reveals a diversity of
investment strategies. Early entrant Shell has grown into a large integrated and diversified oil
firm in Japan and is pursuing the exploiting its refining and chemical technologies and its
access to oil in its Japanese operations. Unilever, operating in the low technology but
marketing intensive food and personal care industries, has invested in wholly or majority
owned operations to increase market access for its branded products. Both of these groups'
licensing activities in Japan show a high share of intra-group contracts. On the other hand,
chemical manufacturers Akzo-Nobel and DSM have set up a broad range of manufacturing
joint ventures with different Japanese partners. These manufacturing ventures improve access
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to the Japanese market but are also exporting to the rest of Asia. Licensing contracts by these
two chemical groups are mainly with independent Japanese firms. The Japanese
manufacturing subsidiaries of Philips export relatively high shares of turnover to Europe and
the United States and activities are concentrated in sectors where Philips does not hold
significant market shares in Japan (such as lighting and audio & video). Philips uses its
Japanese manufacturing base to establish and improve linkages with the strong local supply
base and the local R&D infrastructure. It does generate substantial income from licensing
agreements with Japanese firms: it was responsible for two thirds of the number of Dutch
licensing contracts in the first half of the 1980s. Its licensing activity mostly reflects its
possession of major compact disk patents and know how. Philips does command significant
market share in a number of markets where it is world leader, such as medical diagnostic
equipment, music, and small electrical appliances. Other firms have also been able to translate
their strengths into a substantial presence in Japan: besides Shell in the oil sector the list
includes Akzo-Nobel in monochloroacetic acids and catalysts for oil refining, Unilever in
margarine, Elsevier in medical journals, ING in life insurance, and Nedlloyd in shipping.
A number of Dutch firms are poised to benefit from the greater opportunities to foreign
firms in the Japanese markets of the mid 1990s. Philips acquired two LCD panel
manufacturing plants of OEM manufacturer Hosiden, Heineken has reduced its dependence on
market leader Kirin with the aim to increase its Japanese sales, Shell is planning a tie-up with
Mitsubishi Oil to become the largest refiner in Japan, and software house Baan en packaging
group Van Leer both made new entries in Japan. What remains striking, though, is the
complete or near absence from Japan of a large number of Dutch MNEs which have been very
active in expanding in Europe and the United States. Even an important share of the growth in
Japanese operations of Unilever, Akzo-Nobel, and DSM has been a by-product of their US
acquisitions, which brought US firms' Japanese subsidiaries under their control. The new
opportunities for market entry and acquisitions in Japan demonstrated by the experience of a
number of Dutch firms and pioneers such as Toys R Us warrant a much greater focus on the
Japanese market by Dutch MNEs than has been the case until today.
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Table 1. Japan's FDI Imbalance in Perspective: FDI Flows 1990-1994 for Selected Countries (mln $)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1990-1994
Japan
Outward 48050 30740 17240 13740 17790 127560
Inward 1760 1370 2720 100 890 6840
Ratio 27.3 22.4 6.3 137.4 20.0 18.6
United States
Outward 29950 31380 42660 72590 49380 225960
Inward 47920 22020 17580 41110 49420 178050
Ratio 0.6 1.4 2.4 1.8 1.0 1.3
United Kingdom
Outward 19327 16304 18892 25671 25334 105528
Inward 32430 16208 14934 14475 10085 88132
Ratio 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.5 1.2
Germany
Outward 24210 23720 19670 14480 14650 96730
Inward 2490 4070 2440 320 -3020 6300
Ratio 9.7 5.8 8.1 45.3 -4.9 15.4
France
Outward 34882 23932 31269 20604 22800 133487
Inward 13183 15149 21843 20755 17138 88068
Ratio 2.6 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.5
Netherlands
Outward 15388 13561 14338 10555 11366 65208
World share 7 7 8 5 6 6
Inward 12349 6316 7700 6084 3473 35922
Ratio 1.2 2.1 1.9 1.7 3.3 1.8
World 235529 195233 190030 208456 203229 1032477
Source: JETRO (1996b)
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Table 2. Japan's FDI Imbalance: Number of Employees in Foreign-Affiliated Firms in Japan and in Japanese-Affiliated Abroad, 1994.
Investing Country: Japan US Japan Europe Japan World
Host Country: US Japan Balance Europe Japan Balance World Japan Balance
Manufacturing 252277 99230 2.5 148136 30296 4.9 1044484 139666 7.5
  Food 15190 3322 4.6 728 185 3.9 31747 3646 8.7
  Textiles 3713 0 inf 1062 1499 0.7 62491 1510 41.4
  Wood & paper 1879 477 3.9 336 483 0.7 10617 4226 2.5
  Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 23338 26451 0.9 20241 14605 1.4 61768 41682 1.5
  Oil 55 5789 0.0 16 2399 0.0 553 8228 0.1
  Steel 15920 0 inf 394 1158 0.3 22234 1230 18.1
  Non-ferrous metals 4245 659 6.4 495 60 8.3 17086 5758 3.0
  General machinery 15775 10413 1.5 9901 2649 3.7 70350 13093 5.4
  Electrical & electronics 67614 46004 1.5 59820 2988 20.0 435726 49163 8.9
  Transport machinery 31688 1045 30.3 29482 1056 27.9 160993 2129 75.6
  Precision machinery & optical 1699 2796 0.6 1798 2004 0.9 27801 4916 5.7
  Other manufacturing 71157 3180 22.4 23863 2701 8.8 143028 9237 15.5
Distribution 129463 9762 13.3 50714 10251 4.9 236610 22749 10.4
Services 15798 2438 6.5 3412 1024 3.3 36929 3636 10.2
Other non-manufacturing 12646 1435 8.8 7021 1318 5.3 37212 3039 12.2
All industries 410184 112865 3.6 209283 42889 4.9 1355235 169090 8.0
Response Ratio 65 50 65 50 65 50
Ownership >50 >33 >50 >33 >50 >33
Sources: MITI (1995a, 1995b) 
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Table 3. Subsidiaries of Dutch MNEs in Japan by Industry in 1994
# Subs Assets Employees % all Sales % all Pre-Tax Profits %
(billion Yen) countries (billion Yen) Countries (million Yen) Sales
Manufacturing 32 169 3854 2.8 212.6 2.3 6010 2.8
  Food 2 6.5 6 0.2 12.4 5.2 589 4.8
  Textiles 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Wood 1 3.7 167 53.0 5.0 46.7 171 3.4
  Paper 1 0 3 0.9 0.0 0.0
  Printing & publishing 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Chemicals 10 68.4 723 3.9 47.3 4.3 2221 4.7
  Pharmaceuticals 4 16.3 579 2.8 22.9 2.6 1851 8.1
  Oil 2 1 35 0.4 1.7 0.1 42 2.5
  Rubber 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Leather 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  building materials 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Steel 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Non-ferrous metals 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Metal products 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  General machinery 2 7.7 95 0.7 7.3 1.5 -673 -9.2
  Electrical & electronics 6 49.5 2093 4.3 92.8 4.1 1572 1.7
  Transport machinery 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Precision machinery & optical 3 15.6 139 2.8 22.9 10.5 242 1.1
  Other manufacturing 1 0.3 14 0.9 0.3 0.2 -5 -1.7
0
Distribution 25 96.8 1990 8.7 233.0 5.9 -792 -0.3
Services 3 6.4 337 9.3 17.5 9.9 460 2.6
Other non-manufacturing 3 16.2 543 17.9 17.8 15.3 1091 6.1
All industries 63 288.4 6724 4.0 480.8 3.6 6769 1.4
Source: MITI (1995b)
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Table 4. Subsidiaries of Dutch MNEs in Japan by Industry in 1991: Exports and Imports
of which: of which:
Sales Export Export Intra-Firm Import Import Intra-Firm Trade Balance
(billion Yen) (billion Yen) % Sales % (billion Yen) % Sales % (billion Yen)
Manufacturing 261.2 61.4 23.5 34.4 41.1 15.7 33.6 20.3
  Food 12.2 0 0.0 0.3 2.2 99.2 -0.3
  Wood 4.7 0.5 10.6 0.0 0.3 7.3 0.0 0.2
  Printing & publishing 0.1 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Chemicals 43.6 2 4.6 5.0 3.3 7.5 57.1 -1.3
  Pharmaceuticals 31.0 0 0.0 17.5 56.5 5.2 -17.5
  Oil 0.3 0 0.0 0.2 75.7 100.0 -0.2
  Non-ferrous metals 1.3 0 0.0 0.3 21.6 80.1 -0.3
  General machinery 3.4 0.9 26.5 44.4 0.3 7.6 83.8 0.6
  Electrical & electronics 72.0 44.4 61.7 28.4 8.4 11.7 74.7 36.0
  Precision machinery & optical 25.1 13.2 52.6 60.6 7.0 28.0 44.1 6.2
  Other Manufacturing 67.5 0.4 0.6 0.0 3.5 5.3 2.3 -3.1
Distribution 612.4 149 24.3 94.6 120.7 19.7 37.5 28.3
Services 22.2 0.3 1.4 0.0 5.5 24.7 100.0 -5.2
Other non-manufacturing 16.6 14.5 87.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 100.0 14.5
All industries 912.4 225.3 24.7 71.9 167.3 18.3 38.6 58.0
Source: MITI (1992)
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Table 5. Imports and Exports by Subsidiaries of Dutch MNEs: Regions of Origin and Destination in 1991
Manufacturing Affiliates:
Export Import Export Import Balance
(%) (%) (Billion Yen) (Billion Yen) (Billion Yen)
North America 30.7 8.5 18.9 3.5 15.4
Asia 24.3 22.4 14.9 9.2 5.7
Europe 41.8 68.6 25.7 28.2 -2.5
  UK, France, Germany, Switzerland 4.0 44.2 2.0 18.2 -16.2
  other countries 37.8 24.4 23.7 10.0 13.7
Other Regions 3.2 0.5 1.9 0.2 1.7
Total 100.0 100.0 61.4 41.1 20.3
Distribution Affiliates:
Export Import Export Import Balance
(%) (%) (Billion Yen) (Billion Yen) (Billion Yen)
North America 9.7 6.2 14.6 7.3 7.3
Asia 20.5 16.7 30.6 20.1 10.5
Europe 64.5 77.1 96.1 93.1 3.0
  UK, France, Germany, Switzerland 13.4 51.6 20.1 53.3 -33.2
  other countries 51.1 25.5 76.0 39.8 36.2
Other Regions 5.3 0.0 7.8 0.1 7.7
Total 100.0 100.0 149.1 120.6 28.5
Source: MITI (1992)
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Table 6. Number of Licensing Contracts Imported from the Netherlands in 1994 by Product/Technology
Netherlands All Countries Netherlands
# contracts % # contracts Share (%)
Manufacturing 87 97.8 3112 2.8
  Food 2 2.2 27 7.4
  Textiles & apparel 4 4.5 193 2.1
  Wood & furniture 0 0.0 8 0.0
  Paper, printing & publishing 0 0.0 10 0.0
  Chemicals 4 4.5 80 5.0
  Pharmaceuticals 0 0.0 95 0.0
  Oil 0 0.0 5 0.0
  Rubber 1 1.1 4 25.0
  Plastics products 3 3.4 41 7.3
  Leather 2 2.2 32 6.3
  Building materials 2 2.2 28 7.1
  Steel 0 0.0 12 0.0
  Non-ferrous metals 0 0.0 10 0.0
  Metal products 1 1.1 20 5.0
  General machinery 16 18.0 231 6.9
    boilers & generators 0 0.0 75 0.0
    Chemical machinery 8 9.0 54 14.8
    Others 8 9.0 102 7.8
  Electrical & electronics 49 55.1 2092 2.3
    Heavy electrical equipment 0 0.0 12 0.0
    White goods & light bulbs 0 0.0 7 0.0
    Telecommunications equipment 2 2.2 59 3.4
    Radio & television 17 19.1 85 20.0
    Computers & software 19 21.3 1740 1.1
    Components & semiconductors 4 4.5 125 3.2
    VCRs, medical electronics 7 7.9 55 12.7
    Others 0 0.0 9 0.0
  Transport machinery 1 1.1 33 3.0
  Precision machinery & optical 0 0.0 90 0.0
  Other products 2 2.2 42 4.8
    Sports, music 2 2.2 22 9.1
    Others 0 0.0 20 0.0
Services & utilities 2 2.2 35 5.7
All industries 89 100.0 3161 2.8
Source: NISTEP (1996)
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Table 7.  Main Subsidiaries of Dutch MNEs in Japan, 1995
Name Own Establ. Paid-in Sales Income Empl. Activ. Imp. Exp. Line of Busines Partner(s) Stake Remarks
% Capital % %
Shell
Showa Shell Group
Showa Shell Sekiyu 62 1901 34198 f1354414 4448 2395 I,M,D 0 oil and petrochemicals various through Shell (UK)
Showa Yokkaichi Sekiyu 75 1957 4000 31201 973 658 M 0 0 oil products Mitsubishi Kasei 4.2, others through Showa Shell
Toa Oil 42 1924 4961 30341 1145 507 M 0 oil products various through Showa Shell
Nippon Grease 49.6 1941 100 a11677 225 M grease, petrochemicals various through Showa Shell
Shoseki Kako 100 1953 200 8409 170 M,D asphalt through Showa Shell
Shoseki Shoji 100 1952 100 5544 60 D petrochemicals sales through Showa Shell
Shoseki Gas 100 1941 100 280 D gas distribution through Showa Shell
Shoseki Engineering 100 1979 100 286 construction through Showa Shell
Showa Shell Sempaku 100 1976 450 41290 175 18 transport through Showa Shell
Shoseki Oil Development
 Vietnam
55 1992 1827 15 oil exporation Sekiyu Kodan 45 through Showa Shell
Shell Japan Group
Shell Japan 100 1963 12100 64100 8379 350 I,M,D,E 49 16petrochemicals, LNG through Shell (UK)
Yuka Shell Epoxy 59.7 1979 1200 135 M chemicals Mitsubishi Chemical through Shell (UK)
Showa Solar Energy 75 1986 494 1500 b37 I,M,D,E 50 70solar batteries, panels Siemens 25 through Shell (UK)
Total Shell 5099
Philips
Philips Japan Group
Philips Japan 100 1953 4000 117300 2065 619 I,D,E electronics
Philips Lighting 100 1992 50 4700 260 237 I,M,D,E 7 40halogen, metal halide lamps acquired 1992
Philips Medical Systems 100 1987 480 b22000 150 I,D medical equipment
Philips Mediservice 100 1991 110 80 D medical equipment services
Marantz Group
Marantz Japan 50 1981 1135 f43897 594 953 M,D,E 41audio, video various Acquisition of 50% stake
Miyako Audio 100 1981 50 200 audio, video through Marantz
Standard Communications KK 100 1984 20 60 audio, video through Marantz
Standard Communications Corp.100 1981 50 295 audio, video through Marantz
Polygram Group
Polygram KK 100 1990 3561 82363 320 M CDs, audiotapes through Polygram (Neth)
Polydor KK 99 1953 480 d840 100 D CDs, video, audiotapes through Polygram (Neth)
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Mercury Music Entertainment 100 1970 400 9400 471 50 I,D 20 CDs, records, audiotapes through Polygram (Neth)
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Table 7 (continued)
Name Own Establ. Paid-in Sales Income Empl. Activ. Imp. Exp. Line of Busines Partner(s) Stake Remarks
% Capital % %
Others
ASM Japan 100 1982 2900 125 I,M,D,E 5 20semiconductor steppers through ASM (Neth)
Signetics Japan 100 1988 e60 E8000 D,I semiconductors acquisition Signectics (US) 1988
PNN 40 1986 1500 731 130 M,D ceramic electronic devices Nippon Steel 30, Nih. C emicon 30
Philips Sensor Technology 50 1987 180 23 I,M,D,E 10 10sensors Nihon LCR 50 R&D focus
Nihon Micromotor 49 1979 200 e3 M,D micromotors Foster Electric 51
Denshi Media Services 25 1987 300 30 M,D CD-I software design Toppan Printing 75
Kyocera & Philips Datanet 50 1985 200 E6000 e20 I,D telecommunications software Kyocera 50
Total Philips 3372
Unilever
Wholly Owned
Nippon Lever 100 1973 f90000 1000 M,D foodstuffs, detergents, fats and oils
Ablestik Japan 100 1984 34 39 M,D chemicals
Quest International Japan 100 1963 480 100 I,M,D,E aromatics, flavourings
Lipton Lever 100 1990 50 D food, margarine
Joint Ventures
Japan Black Tea 30 1973 193 237 I,M,D,E tea Mitsubishi Corp 39, others
Lipton Japan 70 1984 300 M,D (Japanese) tea Mitsui Corp 15, others
US acquisitions
Kanebo-NSC 95 1987 250 14128 1663 350 M,D 2 2 resins, adhesives Kanebo 5 acquisition NSC (US) 1987
Elisabeth Arden Japan 100 1989 228 260 personal care products Acq. Elisabeth Arden (US) 1989
NSC Japan 100 1987 50 27 I,M,D,E 90 10starch, reinforcing agents acquisition NSC (US) 1987
Total Unilever 2013
Akzo-Nobel
Manufacturing Joint Ventures
Nippon Organon 60 1960 277 13000 854 260 I,M,D 100 0 pharmaceuticals Sankyo 40
Tosoh Akzo 50 1987 500 7373 1142 191 M,D,E 0 16calcium, titanium Tosoh 50 acquisition Stauffer (US) 1987
Akzo Kashima 70 1975 2000 a138 147 M 0 0 sulphur, posphate Tosoh 30 R&D
Nippon Ketjen 50 1970 480 c4000 1401 112 M, D 5 20oil refining catalysts Sumitomo Kinzoku Kosan 50
Lion Akzo 50 1963 900 8002 746 104 M,D acid derivatives Lion 50
Kayaku Akzo 50 1970 400 989 100 M,D organic peroxide Nihon Kayaku 50
Denak 50 1976 1200 134 5 I,M,D,E 50monchloroacetic acids Denki Kagaku Kogyo 30, Mitsui Toatsu Kagaku 20
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Toa Akzo Coatings 50 1979 230 M,D,E car paints Toa Paint 50
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Table 7 (continued)
Name Own Establ. Paid-in Sales Income Empl. Activ. Imp. Exp. Line of Busines Partner(s) Stake Remarks
% Capital % %
Wholly owned
Akzo Nobel KK 100 1973 2000 b119 43 I,M,D,E chemicals  merged with Stauffer Japan in
1988
Akzo Nobel Coatings 100 1984 230 60 I,D 100 car paints
Organon Teknika 100 1979 169 50 I,D pharmaceuticals
Nihon Akzo Pharma 100 1975 230 I,D pharmaceuticals
Distribution Joint Ventures
Nippon Aramid 50 1987 200 13 I,D 100 0 aramid Sumitomo Kagaku 50
Nissan-Eka Nobel 50 1986 120 8 I,D 60 0 paper processing agents Nissan Kagaku Kogyo 50 through Eka Nobel (Sweden)
Nihon Interstab 50 1972 30 I,D plastic materials Dainippon Ink Chemicals 50
Total Akzo 1093
DSM
Manufacturing Joint Ventures
Nippon Polypenco 45 1989 240 c4873 247 107 M,D 4 0 engineering plastics, nylon Mitubishi Resin 55 acquisition Polymer (US) 1989
DSM Idemitsu 50 1988 4700 d2870 100 I,M,D,E 0 50synthetic rubber Idemitsu Chemical 50 exports to Asia
Nihon Dyneema 50 1987 80 5 M,D polystyrene Toyobo 50
MD Composites 50 1992 800 M artificial fibers, resins Sankyo Toatsu Kagaku 50
Wholly Owned
DSM Japan 100 1990 40 10 M,D resins, chemicals
Distribution Joint Ventures
Japan Fine Coatings 50 1982 92 2556 443 1 I,D,E 5 10coatings for plastic & paper Japan Synthetic Rubber 50
U-Pica DSM Resins 50 1991 20 I,D resins Nihon U-Pica 50
Total DSM 223
Other Dutch Industrial MNEs
Heineken
Heineken Japan 51 1983 200 2920 60 I,D 60 0 beer Kirin (49)
Friesland (Frico Domo)
Foremost Blue Seal 100 1963 152 50 I,D dairy products
Norit
Norit Japan 100 1982 50 3 I,D chemicals
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Table 7 (continued)
Name Own Establ. Paid-in Sales Income Empl. Activ. Imp. Exp. Line of Busines Partner(s) Stake Remarks
% Capital % %
Hunter Douglas
Hunter Douglas Japan 77 1973 93 1598 107 37 M,D,I 100 0 aluminium panels Sankyo Aluminium 23
Hunter Douglas Window Fashions50 1989 400 20 M,D,I 100 0 blinds Sekisui Resin 50
Hunter Douglas Metals Japan 100 1984 25 3 D,I aluminium products
Van Leer
Van Leer Japan 99.5 1992 40 5 D,I 50 0 steel drums
Tri-Sure Japan 100 1962 155 194 3 D,I 70 0 cans and drums
Stork
Stork Nippon TP 100 1994 10 11 I,D printing machinery
Delft Instruments
Oldelft Japan 100 1968 20 6 I,D Instruments, radar
Greenland
Vicon Japan 95 1975 46 16 I,D machinery
Dutch MNEs in Banking & Insurance, Services, and International Trade
Borsumij Wehry
Geo Wehry International 100 1955 95 3933 197 47 I,D 94 0 international trade
Van Ommeren
Seino Votanier Logix 60 1985 10 I,D,E international trade Seino Transport 40
Hagemeyer
Hagemeyer Import&Export 100 1968 80 I,D,E international trade
Nedlloyd
Nedlloyd Lines 100 1973 100 2095 140 international shipping
Nedlloyd Lines Nagoya 50 1972 30 30 transport Through Nedlloyd (Hong Kong)
Reed-Elsevier
Excerpta Medica 100 1980 60 c92 41 I,D publishing of medical journals
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Table 7 (continued)
Name Own Establ. Paid-in Sales Income Empl. Activ. Imp. Exp. Line of Busines Partner(s) Stake Remarks
% Capital % %
Baan Company
Baan Japan 100 1995 230 39 software
ABN-Amro
ABN AMRO Bank 100 1950 121 banking assets 1187 billion Yen
ABN-Amro Securities 100 1987 3204 826 19 securities trading
Mees-Pierson Capital Management100 1987 125 124 5 investment banking through Mees Pierson
International (Switzerland)
ING
Nationale Nederlanden Life
Insurance
100 1984 8000 362 life insurance
ING Bank 100 1985 71 banking assets 275 billion Yen
Notes: Establ. = year of establishment or year of acquisition,  paid in capital in million Yen, income is declared taxable income in million Yen,
sales is unconsolidated sales in million Yen if not indicated otherwise, Imp. is imports as percentage of total procurement, exp. is export as
percentage of sales, I = import, M = manufacturing,  D = distribution, E = export.
a 1990
b 1991
c 1992
d 1993
e 1988
f consolidated basis
Sources: Dodwell (1988, 1992, 1994)), Keizai Chousakai (1994), Toyo Keizai (1995), Dun & Bradstreet (1996)
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Table 8. Characteristics of Licensing Contracts by Dutch Firms in Japan, 1981-1986
Philips
Number of Contracts: 102
Group Companies:Philips Export (22), Philips Gloeilampen Fabrieken (54), US Philips Corp. (4), Polygram Germany (17)
Total Overseas: 23
Main Licensees: Toshiba (6), Pioneer (5), Sanyo Electric (5), Teac (3), Asahi Electric (3), Nippon Columbia (3), Marantz (3)
Intra-Firm: 6
Trademarks: 2
Products: Micro cassette players (5), other audio (7), CDs and video disks (7), CD cases (24), CD Players (39),
semiconductors (9), software (3), colour televisions (3)
Shell
Number of Contracts:42
Group Companies:Shell International Petroleum (9), Shell International Petroleum UK (3), Shell Oil US (5), She l Research UK
(22), Wavin (1)
Total Overseas: 32
Main Licensees: Shell Kosan (4), Showa Oil (7), Sumitomo Chemical (4), Seibu Oil (5), Shukka Shell Epoxy (3), Chiyoda
Kako Kentetsu (5), Toa Oil (3)
Intra-Firm: 23
Trademarks: 3
Products: Petrochemicals (10), software (3), chemical processes & machinery (18), exploration (2)
Akzo-Nobel
Number of Contracts:9
Group Companies:Enka (4), Organon (2), AKZO Chemie (2), AKZO Coatings (1)
Intra-Firm: 1
Trademarks: 1
Products: Paint (1), rubber processing technology (3), chemical machinery (2), plastics (1), general know how (1)
Unilever
Number of Contracts:7
Group Companies:Lipton UK (4), Unilever NV (3)
Total Overseas: 4
Main Licensees: Lipton Japan (4), Nippon Lever (2)
Intra-Firm: 6
Trademarks: 4
Products: Tea (4), soap (1), margarine (1)
DSM
Number of Contracts:5
Group Companies:Stamiecarbon (4), DSM Resins (1)
Intra-Firm: 0
Trademarks: 0
Products: Polystyrene (1), chemical machinery (2), polyester (1)
Gist-Brocades
Number of Contracts:5
Group Companies:Gist Brocades (5)
Intra-Firm: 0
Trademarks: 1
Produts:Pharmaceuticals
Other Firms: KLM (1), SHV (1), Friesland Frico Domo (1), Smit Ovens Nijmegen (3), Marine Structure Consultants (4),
Stork (1), Schokbeton (1), Fugro (1), Gispen (1)
Source: calculations based on STA (1982-1987)
